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In every Establishment Clause case, we must reconcile the inescapable tension
between the objective of preventing unnecessary intrusion of either the church
or the state upon the other, and the reality that, as the Court has so often noted,
total separation of the two is not possible. 1
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1965, the city of Plattsmouth, Nebraska, allowed a monument to
be placed in the corner of its forty-five acre park.2 The monument,
although small in stature, recently generated significant controversy
in this small Nebraska town. The subject of this Note, ACLU of Ne-
braska Foundation v. City of Plattsmouth (Plattsmouth II),3 is the re-
sult of the city's refusal to take down its monument and the American
Civil Liberties Union's ("ACLU") conclusion that the monument vio-
lated the First Amendment.4
The Ten Commandments, often referred to as the Decalogue,5 and
several other religious symbols are inscribed on the face of the chal-
lenged monument. 6 Long ago, there was no doubt that the Ten Com-
mandments were given to establish a religious form of government. 7
The Ten Commandments are a Near East suzerain-vassel treaty be-
tween Yahweh and the Nation of Israel.8 They can be understood as
the Constitution of Israel as well as a basis for its criminal law code,
and "although [the parameters ofl certain crimes were expanded and
1. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 672 (1984).
2. Aff. John G. Winkler 11 3, 4, 14, ACLU Neb. Found. v. City of Plattsmouth, 186
F. Supp. 2d 1024 (D. Neb. 2002) [hereinafter Winkler Affidavit]. Plattsmouth is a
city of about 7,200 residents, located in southeast Nebraska.
3. 419 F.3d 772 (8th Cir. 2005).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion . . . ."). The First Amendment is applied to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
5. "Decalogue" is the English translation of the Greek word dekalogos. NEW
SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 605 (4th ed. 1993). It is used to refer to
the Ten Commandments, since deka means "ten" and logos means "speech." Id.
6. Plattsmouth 11, 419 F.3d at 773.
7. See Exodus 19-31.
8. ANTHONY PHILLIPS, ANCIENT ISRAEL'S CRIMINAL LAW: A NEW APPROACH TO THE
DECALOGUE 6 (1970). A suzerain-vassal treaty was a treaty between a king (su-
zerain) and his subjects (vassels). In a typical treaty, a vassal, because of "certain
historical events enumerated in the prologue of the treaty, bound himself in abso-
lute obedience to the Hittite king, but was left free to determine his state's inter-
nal affairs. While it was presupposed that the Hittite king would give to the
vassal his protection, no specific obligations were laid upon him, and he was not a
'party' to the treaty." Id. at 3.
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reinterpreted, no new crimes were added to her law . . . ."9 Platts-
mouth's monument proclaims a message similar to that which Moses
brought down from Mount Sinai, as well as an inscription denoting
who erected that particular monument:
the Ten Commandments
I AM the LORD thy God.
Thou shalt have no other gods before me.
Thou shalt not make to thyself any graven image.
Thou shalt not take the Name of the Lord thy God in vain.
Remember the Sabbath day to keep it holy.
Honor thy father and thy mother that thy days may be long upon
the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee.
Thou shalt not kill.
Thou shalt not commit adultery.
Thou shalt not steal.
Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor.
Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's house.
Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife nor his manservant nor his
maidservant, nor his cattle nor anything that is thy neighbor's.
PRESENTED TO THE CITY OF PLATTSMOUTH, NEBRASKA
BY
FRATERNAL ORDER OF EAGLES
PLATTSMOUTH AERIE NO. 365-1965.1o
The text of the monument and the organization which donated it are
at the center of many lawsuits around the county. The Fraternal Or-
der of Eagles ("Eagles")11 donated scores1 2 of these granite monu-
9. Id. at 10.
10. ACLU Neb. Found. v. City of Plattsmouth, 358 F.3d 1020, 1024-25 (8th Cir.
2004), rev'd, 419 F.3d 772 (8th Cir. 2005). Cf Exodus 19-31.
11. The Fraternal Order of Eagles was founded in Seattle, Washington in 1898 and
maintains its headquarters in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. The Eagles have about
800,000 members and an additional 350,000 members of its women's auxiliary in
over 1,800 aeries (local chapters) across the United States and Canada. Ne-
braska and Iowa have forty-three and forty aeries respectively. Todd Von
Kampen, Plattsmouth Sued To Remove Marker ACLU Nebraska follows up its
6-month-old promise to take the city to court over the Ten Commandments,
OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, May 18, 2001, at A19. For additional information about
the Eagles, see the website of the Fraternal Order of the Eagles International,
http://www.foe.com (last visited Feb. 14, 2006).
12. In the panel opinion, the majority concluded that the Eagles donated "scores" of
monuments. Plattsmouth, 358 F.3d at 1025. The dissent concluded that there
were "thousands." Id. at 1046 (Bowman, J., dissenting). In another Eagles monu-
ment case, the court found that "Cecil B. DeMille distributed some 5,500 stone
copies" of the Decalogue. Chambers v. City of Frederick, 373 F. Supp. 2d 567, 569
(D. Md. 2005). The national Eagles' organization does not know how many monu-
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ments to towns, cities, and states across the United States during the
1950s and 1960s. 13 The monuments were then erected on public prop-
erty. The municipalities and states that received these monuments as
gifts now face allegations by the ACLU and similar organizations that
the monuments violate the United States Constitution's Establish-
ment Clause.14 The current debate surrounding the Eagles' monu-
ments involves whether a government body's display of the Decalogue
purports to establish a religion or religious form of government, or
whether the monument is displayed as a history lesson in the founda-
tion of the laws of American government or as a permanent "thank
you" to the Eagles.
The Plattsmouth monument's message and location have spawned
a lengthy legal battle. On May 17, 2001, the ACLU and local plaintiff
John Doe15 sued the city to remove the monument. 16 Nebraska Dis-
ments were donated by local aeries. See e-mail from Charles K. Cunningham,
Assistant to the Grand Secretary, Fraternal Order of Eagles, to Author (Oct. 5,
2004, 07:58 CST) (on file with the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW). Other than the monu-
ment in Plattsmouth, local aeries have donated monuments that have been
placed on the lawn of the Otoe County Courthouse in Nebraska City, Nebraska in
1961; Memorial Park in Fremont, Nebraska in 1961; the Hastings Museum in
Hastings, Nebraska in 1959; Harmon Park in Kearney, Nebraska in 1957; and
Boys Town in Omaha, Nebraska in 1956. Todd von Kampen, Otoe County Tab-
lets' Site sold for $1 to Eagles, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Nov. 30, 2001, at B1.
13. Plattsmouth, 358 F.3d at 1025.
14. See, e.g., Indiana Civil Liberties Union v. O'Bannon, 259 F.3d 766, 768 (7th Cir.
2001) (upholding an injunction prohibiting the defendant from placing a Ten
Commandments monument on the grounds of the Indiana state capitol); Cham-
bers, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 573 (holding that the city's sale of a parcel of land which
contained an Eagles monument to the Fraternal Order of Eagles did not violate
the Establishment Clause); Mercier v. City of La Crosse, 305 F. Supp. 2d 999,
1011 (W.D. Wis. 2004), rev'd, 395 F.3d 693, 705-06 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that
the city's sale of a parcel of land on which an Eagles monument stood did not
violate the Establishment Clause), en banc reh'g denied, Nos. 04-1321 & 04-1524,
2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 3480 (7th Cir. Feb. 28, 2005); Kimbley v. Lawrence
County, 119 F. Supp. 2d 856, 858 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (holding that a Ten Command-
ments monument displayed on the grounds of the Lawrence County Courthouse
violated the Establishment Clause). In Everett, Washington, a twenty-one-year-
old resident sued to remove an Eagles monument standing in front of Everett's
police headquarters. Rachel Tuinstra, Constitutionality Debated in Suit Over
Monument, SEArrLE TIMES, Oct. 6, 2004, at B4.
15. The district court granted a motion on May 17, 2001 by plaintiffACLU Nebraska
and plaintiff John Doe for an order allowing the use of a pseudonym. See Docket
Proceedings at A-1, ACLU Neb. Found. v. City of Plattsmouth, 186 F. Supp. 2d
1024 (D. Neb. 2002) (on file with the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW) [hereinafter Docket
Proceedings]. On September 21, 2004, United States District Court Judge Rich-
ard Kopf heard arguments on a lawsuit filed by the ACLU on behalf of Doe seek-
ing to prohibit the Omaha World-Herald from publishing his true identity.
Apparently the "cat already [was] out of the bag" on Doe's true identity. Accord-
ing to several exhibits provided by the World-Herald, Doe trumpeted his religious
beliefs and publicly indicated he was the person behind the lawsuit. Judge Kopf
ruled that the newspaper could publish Doe's identity, partly because the United
1000
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trict Court Judge Richard G. Kopf, relying largely on the Supreme
Court opinion in Stone v. Graham,17 ruled that the monument had the
unconstitutional effect of endorsing religion and granted summary
judgment for the plaintiffs.1S The city appealed and a three judge
panel of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled two to one that the
monument had the unconstitutional purpose and effect of establishing
religion. The Eighth Circuit granted the city's petition for rehearing
and the court of appeals, sitting en banc, heard oral argument on Sep-
tember 15, 2004.19 Before the Eighth Circuit could release its opinion,
the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in two similar
cases involving the Ten Commandments: Van Orden v. Perry2o and
McCreary County v. ACLU.21 The Eighth Circuit delayed its deci-
sion 22 until after the Supreme Court ruled in Van Orden v. Perry23
and McCreary County v. ACLU24 on June 27, 2005.
Volumes could be written on the mountain of Establishment
Clause jurisprudence. Therefore, this Note will examine the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Plattsmouth II in light of other
cases which involved Eagles Ten Commandments monuments. This
Note presents three assertions: first, the Eighth Circuit properly ap-
plied the Supreme Court's opinion in Van Orden and allowed Platts-
mouth to keep its monument; second, Plattsmouth's monument should
remain even under the Court's current analysis, first asserted in
Lemon v. Kurtzman;2 5 and finally, the Supreme Court should inter-
pret the Establishment Clause to allow all of the Eagles' monuments
to remain on public property. In order to better understand the rocky
States Supreme Court has never upheld a court order restricting a newspaper
prior to publication. See Todd Cooper, Paper May Print Name in Commandments
Case, Judge Says, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Sept. 22, 2004, at B1.
16. See Docket Proceedings, supra note 15, at A-1.
17. 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam). The Supreme Court found that a Kentucky stat-
ute requiring public schools to post the Ten Commandments had "no secular leg-
islative purpose" and was therefore unconstitutional despite Kentucky's attempt
to articulate a secular purpose. Id. at 41. The Court continues to "distinguis[h] a
sham secular purpose from a sincere one" when evaluating an Establishment
Clause challenge. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000).
18. ACLU Neb. Found. v. City of Plattsmouth, 186 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1036 (D. Neb.
2002).
19. See ACLU Neb. Found. v. City of Plattsmouth (Plattsmouth 11), 419 F.3d 772 (8th
Cir. 2005).
20. 125 S. Ct. 346 (2004) (granting the petition for certiorari).
21. 125 S. Ct. 310 (2004) (granting the petition for certiorari).
22. Michael Gans, clerk of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in St. Louis, predicted
that the en banc panel would delay its opinion. John Ferak, Court Takes Up Re-
ligious Monuments; Texas, Kentucky Cases Similar to Plattsmouth's, OMAHA
WORLD-HERALD, Oct. 13, 2004, at Al. The Eighth Circuit waited for the Supreme
Court's decisions because of similar facts involved in all cases.
23. 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005).
24. 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005).
25. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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terrain upon which the court climbed to evaluate the city's monument,
section II.A provides a brief summary of the Supreme Court's Estab-
lishment Clause jurisprudence by focusing on its treatment of Ten
Commandments monuments in Van Orden and McCreary County.
Section II.B describes five appellate court opinions involving Ten
Commandments monuments donated by the Eagles. Part III details
the revelation detailed by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Plattsmouth I. Section IV.A concludes that the Eighth Circuit made
the correct decision and enumerates a four point test for future Eagles
monuments. Section IV.B argues that Plattsmouth's monument also
passes the Supreme Court's Lemon test and heighten "purpose" re-
quirement under McCreary County. Section IV.C argues that the Su-
preme Court should categorically exempt Eagles monuments from
typical Establishment Clause analysis. Finally, Part V will summa-
rize the questions resolved and the questions that remain for the Ea-
gles' Ten Commandments monuments in the Eighth Circuit and the
United States.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S MOST RECENT ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE AND A SURVEY OF
SIMILARLY SITUATED MONUMENTS
The United States Supreme Court's Establishment Clause juris-
prudence is criticized, even by its own members, for inconsistently ap-
plying tests and reaching inconsistent results.26 The Supreme Court
has refused to apply one single test to interpret the Establishment
Clause, instead using different tests in Lemon v. Kurtzman [hereinaf-
ter the "Lemon test"], 2 7 Larson v. Valente,28 Marsh v. Chambers,29
26. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 665-66 n.4 (1989) (Ken-
nedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority's basis for resolving the instant
case is inconsistent with the approach established in recent Supreme Court
precedent).
27. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The principles annunciated in this opinion have widely be-
come known as the Lemon test. See, e.g., Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 237
n.10 (1982) (referring to the test announced in Lemon as the "Lemon test"). Sig-
nificant modifications of this test have occurred since its first declaration. See,
e.g., Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 665-66.
28. 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
29. 463 U.S. 783 (1983). Some have suggested that Marsh play a larger role in Es-
tablishment Clause jurisprudence. See Ashley M. Bell, Comment, "God Save This
Honorable Court": How Current Establishment Clause Jurisprudence Can Be
Reconciled With the Secularization of Historical Religious Expressions, 50 AM. U.
L. REV. 1273 (2001). However, the Supreme Court rejected the opportunity to
expand the principles of Marsh in Allegheny. There, the Court noted, 'Marsh
plainly does not stand for the sweeping proposition ... that all accepted practices
200 years old and their equivalents are constitutional today." Allegheny, 492 U.S.
at 603-04.
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and Lee v. Weisman.30 The Supreme Court's recent decisions in Van
Orden v. Perry3l and McCreary County v. ACLU32 further emphasize
that the Supreme Court will evaluate a religious display based on the
facts and circumstances of each case. 33 However, the Court's deci-
sions in Van Orden and McCreary County provide the background
with which the Eighth Circuit evaluated the Plattsmouth monument.
Therefore, this Note will briefly discuss the reasoning and holding of
each opinion in turn.
A. Fresh Interpretation from Van Orden v. Perry and
McCreary County v. ACLU; Fog on the Mountain
Since the dedication of its state capitol on May 16, 1888, the State
of Texas has allowed seventeen monuments to be placed on its twenty-
two acre grounds. 34 In 1961, by joint resolution of the Texas House
and Senate, the legislature accepted a Ten Commandments monu-
ment from the Eagles.35 The legislative records did not reveal Texas's
purpose in erecting the monument.36 The state selected a site for the
30. 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992) (holding an invocation at a high school graduation cere-
mony exerted "coercive pressure" on students to participate, contrary to the Es-
tablishment Clause).
31. 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005).
32. 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005).
33. The Court allowed one Ten Commandments display to remain but removed two
others. However, time will probably reveal that supporters of the Ten Command-
ments benefited most from the Court's opinions. McCreary County removed only
two Ten Commandments displays based on a subjective analysis of the counties'
purpose. See McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2745. Van Orden will likely allow
thousands of Ten Commandments displays to remain because of its broad lan-
guage. See generally Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. 2854.
34. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2858 (plurality opinion). The twenty-two acre grounds
contain a wide array of monuments dedicated to the "Heroes of the Alamo, Hood's
Brigade, Confederate Soldiers, Volunteer Firemen, Terry's Texas Rangers, Texas
Cowboy, Spanish-American War, Texas National Guard, Ten Commandments,
Tribute to Texas School Children, Texas Pioneer Women, The Boy Scouts' Statute
of Liberty Replica, Pearl Harbor Veterans, Korean War Veterans, Soldiers of
World War I, Disabled Veterans, and Texas Peace Officers." Id. at 2858 n.1.
35. Van Orden v. Perry, 351 F.3d 173, 176 (5th Cir. 2003), affd, 125 S. Ct. 2854
(2005).
36. Because of the lack of legislative records, the parties in Van Orden tried the case
on stipulated facts. Those facts were as follows:
(1) [T]he sparse legislative history "contain[s] no record of any discussion
about the monument, or the reasons for its acceptance, and is comprised
entirely of House and Senate Journal entries"; (2) the State selected the
site on the recommendation of the Building Engineering and Manage-
ment Division of the State Board of Control; (3) the expenses "were borne
exclusively by the Eagles"; (4) the monument requires virtually no main-
tenance; and (5) the dedication of the monument was presided over by
Senator Bruce Reagan and Representative Will Smith. There is no offi-
cial record that any other person participated.
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monument and two legislators presided over its dedication, but the
Eagles paid for the monument to be installed. 37 The monument stood
unmoved except for a 1993 decision by the State Preservation Board to
reorient the monument to place it in a direct line between the legisla-
tive chambers, the state supreme court building, and the governor's
executive office. 38
Beginning in 1995, Thomas Van Orden frequently encountered the
monument while visiting the law library in the supreme court build-
ing, which is located northwest of the capitol grounds.3 9 Van Orden
graduated from Southern Methodist University Law School and was,
at one time, a licensed attorney.40 In 2001, Van Orden sued numerous
state officials to remove the monument. After a bench trial, the court
found that the state had a secular purpose for displaying the monu-
ment and that the reasonable observer would conclude that the pas-
sive monument did not endorse religion.4 1 On appeal, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.42
On June 27, 2005, a divided Supreme Court, whose members wrote
a total of seven opinions, affirmed the judgment of the Fifth Circuit.
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the plurality opinion 43 which Justices
Scalia, 44 Kennedy, and Thomas45 joined. Justice Breyer concurred in
the judgment.4 6 Justices Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, and O'Connor
37. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2858 (plurality opinion).
38. Van Orden, 351 F.3d at 181. The uncontroverted testimony of the board's execu-
tive director "explained that the Decalogue's location was carefully chosen by the
Board's professional staffto reflect the role of the Commandments in the making
of law." Id. This fact was omitted in the Supreme Court's plurality opinion. See
generally Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. 2854.
39. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2858 (plurality opinion).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 2858-59. The District Court applied the Lemon test: "[f]irst, the statute
must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect
must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must
not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.'" Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (citations omitted).
42. Van Orden, 351 F.3d at 175.
43. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2858 (plurality opinion).
44. Justice Scalia filed a concurring opinion stating that the Court should adopt a
consistent method of Establishment Clause jurisprudence based on the principle
that "there is nothing unconstitutional in a State's favoring religion generally,
honoring God through public prayer and acknowledgment, or, in a nonproselytiz-
ing manner, venerating the Ten Commandments." Id. at 2864 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
45. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion in which he argued that the Court
should return to the original meaning of the Establishment Clause, reverse prior
holdings that incorporated the Establishment Clause under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause, and analyze violations of the Establishment
Clause depending on whether the activity placed the claimant under undue coer-
cion. See id. at 2864-68 (Thomas, J., concurring).
46. Id. at 2868 (Breyer, J., concurring).
1004
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wrote a total of three dissenting opinions.4 7 In order to best under-
stand the current interpretation of the Establishment Clause under
Van Orden, this Note will consider the plurality opinion and Justice
Breyer's concurring opinion.
The plurality opinion first discussed the "two faces"48 of the
Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence and then analyzed the
display according to "the nature of the monument and ... our Nation's
history."49 The faces are oriented in opposite directions: the first face
examined the "strong role played by religion and religious traditions
throughout our Nation's history,"50 while the second face "looked[ ] to-
ward the principle that governmental intervention in religious mat-
ters can itself endanger religious freedom."5 1 To the plurality, these
two faces represented the Court's dual responsibilities to articulate
the contours of the Establishment Clause in order to uphold both and
offend neither.D2 However, no member of the Court53 could blindly
look only through the eyes of the second face and conclude that the
Establishment Clause prohibited "all governmental acknowledg-
ments, preferences, or accommodations of religion .... "54 The plural-
ity ignored the Lemon test because the test's factors were "'no more
than helpful signposts,'"55 many of the Court's recent Establishment
Clause cases did not apply Lemon,56 and it was "not useful in dealing
with the sort of passive monument that Texas has erected on its Capi-
tol grounds."57
47. Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion, which Justice Ginsburg joined. Id. at
2873 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor filed a dissenting opinion. Id. at
2891 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice Souter filed a dissenting opinion, which
Justices Ginsburg and Stevens joined. Id. at 2892 (Souter, J., dissenting). The
discussion of these dissenting opinions is omitted because the principles dis-
cussed in these opinions are generally explained in Justice Souter's opinion in
McCreary County. See generally McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722
(2005).
48. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2860 (plurality opinion).
49. Id. at 2861.
50. Id. at 2859.
51. Id.
52. Id. ("Reconciling these two faces requires that we neither abdicate our responsi-
bility to maintain a division between church and state nor evince a hostility to
religion by disabling the government from in some ways recognizing our religious
heritage .
53. Id.
54. Id. at 2860 n.3 (citing id. at 2876 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (recognizing that the
Establishment Clause permits some governmental "recognition" or "acknowledg-
ment" of religion); id. at 2894 n.4 (Souter, J., dissenting) (discussing a number of
permissible displays with religious content)).
55. Id. at 2861 (quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1923)).
56. Id. (citing Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); Good New Club v.
Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001)).
57. Id.
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After rejecting Lemon,58 the plurality turned its analysis to the
"nature of the monument and... our nation's history."59 The plural-
ity concluded that the nation's history contained an "unbroken ...
official acknowledgment by all three branches of government of the
role of religion in American life from at least 1789,"60 that our nation's
buildings contain many depictions and sculptures of the Ten Com-
mandments,61 and that the Court's opinions recognized the Deca-
logue's role in society. 62
The plurality concluded that, in certain cases, this history permit-
ted a monument with obvious religious significance because displays
that simply have religious content or a message consistent with a re-
ligious doctrine do not automatically violate the Establishment
Clause.6 3 The plurality seemed to suggest that it could not look only
into the first face and disregard the purpose and context in which the
religious message is communicated. The plurality observed that the
Court's decisions in Stone v. Graham64 and Edwards v. Aguillard,6 5
were examples of a context-public schools-where the Court has
"been particularly vigilant in monitoring compliance with the Estab-
lishment Clause . *..."66 The plurality cited Stone as an example
where the government's "pre-eminent purpose" was "plainly religious"
and therefore contrary to the Establishment Clause.6 7 The plurality
concluded that there was no evidence in the record by which it could
conclude that Texas had a religious purpose and the context of the
monument on the state capitol grounds, coupled with its passive use of
58. Although the plurality dismissed a point-by-point analysis of Lemon, it did con-
sider the state's purpose in erecting the monument, see id. at 2864 n.11, and the
context in which the monument was placed, see id. These two analyses are simi-
lar to the first two prongs of the Lemon test. See supra note 41 and accompany-
ing text.
59. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2861 (plurality opinion).
60. Id. (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 674 (1984)).
61. Id. at 2862-63. The plurality noted that the Supreme Court's own courtroom
contains several depictions of the Ten Commandments. Furthermore, the plural-
ity found that the Decalogue was visible in the United States Capitol, on the floor
of the National Archives, Inside the Department of Justice, on the front of the
Ronald Reagan Building that houses the Court of Appeals and District Court for
the District of Columbia, and in the Chamber of the United States House of Rep-
resentatives. Id.
62. Id. at 2863 (citing McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961); id. at 462
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
63. Id.
64. 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam).
65. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
66. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2863-64 (plurality opinion) (quoting Edwards, 482 U.S.
at 583-84)).
67. Id. at 2864 n.ll (quoting Stone, 449 U.S. at 41). The plurality did not consider a
situation where a monument was placed with a primarily religious purpose. Id.
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the Ten Commandments, did not run afoul of the Establishment
Clause.68
In his concurring opinion, Justice Breyer relied heavily on a con-
curring opinion by Justice Goldberg in School District of Abington
Township v. Schempp.6 9 Justice Breyer found "that there is no simple
and clear measure which by precise application can readily and inva-
riably demark the permissible from the impermissible.70 Rather,
Justice Breyer determined that one should look to the underlying pur-
poses of the Establishment and Free Exercise7 ' Clauses. Justice
Breyer argued that for the government to follow the principles of both
clauses, it must "avoid excessive interference with, or promotion of the
religious" but also must not "purge from the public sphere all that in
any way partakes of religion." 72 In this pursuit, Justice Breyer con-
cluded that "one will inevitably find difficult borderline cases" where
there would be no "test-related substitute for the exercise of legal
judgment."73 Justice Breyer's exercise of legal judgment sought to re-
main true to the underlying purposes of the "Religion Clauses," take
into account the context of the display, and consider the consequences
of the Court's decision in light of the purposes of the Clauses.7 4
Because Justice Breyer determined Van Orden presented a border-
line case, he exercised his "legal judgment."75 Justice Breyer consid-
ered the monument's use of a religious text and determined that the
circumstances surrounding the monument's installation suggested
that Texas intended the non-religious aspects of the monument to
dominate. 76 The circumstances surrounding the Eagles' choice to do-
nate the monument, as well as the other historical monuments in the
area, led Justice Breyer to believe that the state predominately in-
tended the monument to portray moral and historical messages.7 7
Justice Breyer noted that the forty-year presence of the monument
meant that the public considered the monument part of the state's
broader moral and historical heritage. 78 Furthermore, Justice Breyer
feared that a contrary decision would "lead the law to exhibit a hostil-
68. Id. at 2864. As an example of the monument's passive display of the Decalogue
the plurality pointed out that the petitioner "apparently walked by the monu-
ment for a number of years before bringing this lawsuit." Id.
69. 374 U.S. 203, 305 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
70. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2868 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Schempp, 374
U.S. at 306 (Goldberg, J., concurring)).
71. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... prohibiting the free exer-
cise [of religion].").
72. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2868 (Breyer, J., concurring).
73. Id. at 2869.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 2869-70.
77. Id. at 2870.
78. Id.
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ity toward religion that has no place in our Establishment Clause tra-
ditions."79 Finally, Justice Breyer concluded that the monument was
not even the beginning of a slippery slope toward a state-established
religion.8 0
The Supreme Court released McCreary County on the same day as
Van Orden but the decision and reasoning therein show a different
view of the mountain. In McCreary County, a five to four majority of
the Court determined that the counties 8 ' had an unconstitutionally
religious purpose for posting the Ten Commandments and the dis-
plays were therefore unconstitutional.8 2 In the summer of 1999, Mc-
Creary County and Pulaski County, Kentucky, posted a gold-framed
copy of the King James Version of the Ten Commandments in their
respective courthouses.8 3 The McCreary County legislative body
passed an ordinance which required the Decalogue be posted in a high
traffic area in the courthouse. Pulaski County held a ceremony where
the county judge-executive and his pastor hung the monument and
made several comments to the crowd concerning the Divine God and
the moral importance of the Ten Commandments.8 4 In November
1999, the ACLU sued both counties for violation of the First Amend-
ment. 8 5 The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Kentucky granted injunctions in both cases, but instead of taking
down the display, both counties passed resolutions which acknowl-
edged the religious foundations of Kentucky and added several other
religious references to the display.8 6 The court granted the ACLU's
motions for an injunction against both counties, and the counties did
not pursue an appeal. Soon after, the counties posted a third display
79. Id. at 2871.
80. Id.
81. The Court chose to join the petitions of McCreary County and Pulaski County
together because both displayed the Ten Commandments in a similar fashion.
McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2728-29 (2005).
82. Id. at 2732.
83. Id. at 2728.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 2729.
86. Id. at 2729-30.
The documents were the "endowed by their Creator" passage from the
Declaration of Independence; the Preamble to the Constitution of Ken-
tucky; the national motto, "In God We Trust"; a page from the Congres-
sional Record of February 2, 1983, proclaiming the Year of the Bible and
including a statement of the Ten Commandments; a proclamation by
President Abraham Lincoln designating April 30, 1863, a National Day
of Prayer and Humiliation; an excerpt from President Lincoln's "Reply to
Loyal Colored People of Baltimore upon Presentation of a Bible," reading
that "[t]he Bible is the best gift God has ever given to man"; a proclama-
tion by President Reagan making 1983 the Year of the Bible; and the
Mayflower Compact.
Id. (citing ACLU v. McCreary County, 96 F. Supp. 2d 679, 684 (E.D. Ky. 2000);
ACLU v. Pulaski County, 96 F. Supp. 2d 691, 695-96 (E.D. Ky. 2000)).
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and explained its purpose for the new version: "to educate the citizens
of the county regarding some of the documents that played a signifi-
cant role in the foundation of our system of law and government."8 7
The district court subsequently expanded the injunctions to include
the third display, finding the display did not contain a secular pur-
pose. After the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed,8 8 the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari.8 9
The Supreme Court examined the counties' actions under the first
prong of the Lemon test and concluded that the monument lacked a
secular purpose. 9 0 The Court rejected the counties' argument that
their true purpose was unknowable;9 1 rather, the Court stated that a
government body will violate the purpose requirement when "openly
available data supported a commonsense conclusion that a religious
objective permeated the government's action."9 2 The Court then re-
jected the counties' ascribed purpose, holding that the evidence clearly
indicated the counties had a religious purpose.9 3 The Court compared
the counties' purported purposes with the purported purpose in
Stone.94 After analyzing the counties' successive displays of the Deca-
logue, the Court concluded that the "[clounties were simply reaching
for any way to keep a religious document on the walls of courthouses
constitutionally required to embody religious neutrality."95 Therefore,
the Court affirmed the judgment and required the counties to remove
the displays.
B. Five Courts Rule on Eagles Monuments; Thou May and
Thou Shalt Not Allow Eagles Ten Commandments
Monuments
Monuments, such as the one in Plattsmouth's park, were distrib-
uted throughout the United States in the 1950s and 1960s.9 6 This
section will consider cases where the ACLU or similar organizations
challenged a government body's right to retain an Eagles monument
87. Id. at 2731.
88. ACLU v. McCreary County, 354 F.3d 438 (6th Cir. 2003).
89. McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 310 (2004) (granting the petition for
certiorari).
90. McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2732-33.
91. Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Stevens,
O'Connor, Ginsberg, and Breyer joined. Justice Scalia filed a dissent which was
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas. Justice Kennedy also
joined parts II and III of the dissent. Id. at 2748. An analysis of the dissenting
opinion is beyond the scope of this Note, but is discussed briefly infra section
IV.B.
92. Id. at 2735.
93. Id. at 2737.
94. Id. at 2738 (citing Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam)).
95. Id. at 2741.
96. See supra note 12.
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on government property. 97 These challenges have produced opinions
from one state supreme court and four federal courts of appeals.9 8
The five opinions9 9 will be discussed in chronological order, focusing
on facts that are comparable, distinguishable, or pertinent to Platts-
mouth H's outcome.
In the early 1970s, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals heard the
first challenge to an Eagles monument in Anderson v. Salt Lake City
Corp.10 0 At first, the Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake City and
Salt Lake County informally allowed the Eagles to place a monument
on Salt Lake City property near the city-county courthouse. 10 1 Some-
time later, the city and county installed lighting, at their expense, to
highlight the display. The plaintiffs sued to remove the monument as
a violation of the Establishment Clause. 10 2 The court first evaluated
the monument under the Lemon test to determine the monument's
primary purpose and effect.10 3 The court then reviewed other Estab-
lishment Clause cases which found the public display of several relig-
ious items to be constitutional.104 The court determined that the Ten
Commandments had both religious and secular aspects and that both
97. This Note will not consider cases where the government body sold the monument
to a private citizen or organization in order to avoid an Establishment Clause
challenge. See generally Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693 (7th
Cir. 2005) (holding that the sale of a parcel of land which contained an Eagles
monument to the Eagles did not violate the Establishment Clause); Chambers v.
Fredrick, 373 F. Supp. 2d 567 (D. Md. 2005) (same).
98. Van Orden v. Perry, 351 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 2003); Adland v. Russ, 307 F.3d 471
(6th Cir. 2002); Summum v. City of Ogden, 297 F.3d 995 (10th Cir. 2002); Books
v. Elkhart, 235 F.3d 292 (7th Cir. 2000); Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v.
State, 898 P.2d 1013 (Colo. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1111 (1996); see also
Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2003); Christian v. Grand Junction,
No. 01-CV-685, 2001 WL 34047958 (D. Colo. 2001).
99. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals also issued an opinion regarding an Eagles
monument. Van Orden, 351 F.3d 173. This opinion is omitted in light of the
subsequent Supreme Court opinion.
100. 475 F.2d 29 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 879 (1973).
101. Id. at 30. The purpose of the monument was "to inspire all who pause to view
them, with a renewed respect for the law of God, which is our greatest strength
against the forces that threaten our way of life." Id. Arguably, this monument
would not be allowed to stand with this articulated purpose today. Although the
Tenth Circuit did not overrule Anderson when it decided Summan, the panel de-
clined to follow the reasoning or holding of Anderson. See supra notes 77-82 and
accompanying text.
102. Anderson, 475 F.2d at 30.
103. Id. at 32.
104. Id. at 32-33 (citing Paul v. Dade County, 202 So. 2d 833 (Fla. App. 1967), cert.
denied, 207 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1041 (1968) (finding that
the primary purpose of a string of lights on the side of a courthouse, in the form of
a Latin Cross was for a seasonal display); Allen v. Morton, 333 F. Supp. 1088
(D.D.C. 1971) (finding that plaques installed on a cr6che explaining the secular
purpose and history of the pageant allowed the overall effect to be secular); Meyer
v. Oklahoma, 496 P.2d 789 (Okla. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 980 (1972) (finding
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were emphasized on the monument. The court concluded that it did
"not seem reasonable to require the removal of a passive monument,
involving no compulsion, because its accepted precepts, as a founda-
tion for law, reflect the religious nature of the ancient era."1 0 5 The
court held that neither the purpose nor the effect of the monument
tended to establish a religious form of government and allowed the
monument to remain.
The Colorado Supreme Court, in State v. Freedom From Religion
Foundation, Inc. ,106 took the second opportunity to pass judgment on
an Eagles monument. In 1955, the State of Colorado allowed a monu-
ment, slightly smaller than that in Plattsmouth's park, to be placed on
state grounds one block from the state capitol, in Lincoln Park.107 Not
counting trees or other shrubs dedicated to state and national history,
Lincoln Park also contained no less than eight statues or monu-
ments-one as tall as forty-five feet high.108 The court's statement of
facts also provides the most detailed description of the Eagles' purpose
in donating the monuments, as declared by Judge E.J. Ruegemer, a
Minnesota Juvenile Court Judge and Chair of the Eagles' Youth Gui-
dance Committee.1 0 9 Judge Ruegemer wanted to place copies of the
that a fifty-foot-high Latin Cross on the municipal fairgrounds was constitutional
because it was displayed in a secular environment)).
105. Id. at 33 (citing Erwin N. Griswold, Absolute is in the Dark-A Discussion of the
Approach of the Supreme Court to Constitutional Questions, 8 UTAH L. REV. 167,
173-76 (1963)).
106. 898 P.2d 1013 (Colo. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1111 (1996).
107. Id. at 1016. However, the writings, symbols and text of the monument are de-
scribed to be the exact replica of the monument in Plattsmouth's park. See supra
note 6 and accompanying text.
108. The court also describes a large statue of a Native American and a buffalo; a
monument to soldiers who served and died in the Civil War; a bench dedicated as
a Pearl Harbor monument; seven Aspens planted in memory of the Challenger
Astronauts; a forty-five foot tall Veterans War Memorial; a statue in tribute to
J.P. Martinez; a World War II Hispanic Congressional Medal of Honor recipient,
and other Coloradoans of Hispanic descent; a replica of the Liberty Bell with a
quote from Leviticus, "Proclaim liberty throughout the land and unto all inhabi-
tants thereof"; and a flagpole honoring those who served in the military campaign
known as the Spanish-American War. Freedom From Religion Found., 898 P.2d
at 1015-16.
109. The state produced an affidavit from Judge Ruegemer stating the purpose of the
monuments. The court's summary of Ruegemer's affidavit is the most thorough
and accurate statement of the Eagles' purpose:
In 1943, a Minnesota juvenile court judge decided to address what he
perceived as a need of many juveniles he had encountered in his court.
Believing these juveniles were "without any code of conduct or standards
by which to govern their actions," the judge thought 'they could benefit
from exposure to one of mankind's earliest codes of conduct, the Ten
Commandments." He made clear, however that such exposure 'was not
to be a religious instruction of any kind." The juvenile judge decided to
post a copy of the Ten Commandments in state juvenile courts across the
country as part of a nationwide youth guidance program. The judge was
1011
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84:997
Ten Commandments in public places to inform youth that there were
standards to govern their actions.11o Near the time when the Youth
Guidance Committee decided to distribute copies of the Ten Com-
mandments, Hollywood Producer Cecil B. DeMille, producer of the
movie The Ten Commandments, contacted Judge Ruegemer and asked
if the monuments could be distributed in connection with his movie
release.111 DeMille played a significant role in the widespread distri-
bution of the monuments and intended the monuments to be part of
his advertising campaign. 1 12
The Colorado Supreme Court applied the Lemon test1 13 and held
that the content and the setting of the monument were sufficient to
"neutralize its religious character resulting in neither an endorsement
nor a disapproval of religion."114 In determining the state's purpose,
the court distinguished Stone and a federal district court holding in
Ring v. Grand Forks Public School District No. 1,115 from the Tenth
of the opinion that the commandments would demonstrate to the youths
coming in contact with the juvenile courts that there were long "recog-
nized codes of behavior to guide and help them."
As chair of the Youth Guidance Committee of the Fraternal Order of
Eagles (the "Eagles"), the judge presented his idea to the Eagles for fi-
nancial support. Initially the Eagles rejected the notion of sponsoring
the National Youth Guidance Program because it was felt that such dis-
tribution "might seem coercive or sectarian." However, after representa-
tives of the Jewish, Protestant, and Catholic faiths were able to develop
a version of the Ten Commandments which was not identified with any
particular religious group, the Eagles agreed to support such a youth
program.
At the same time, the juvenile judge received a telephone call from
motion picture producer Cecil B. DeMille, who was then producing the
movie "The Ten Commandments." Mr. DeMille suggested distributing
copies of the Ten Commandments to coincide with the release of the
movie. As a promotion of his movie, no doubt, Mr. DeMille suggested
that bronze plaques be produced with the Ten Commandments im-
printed for distribution throughout the country. Because "the original
Ten Commandments were on granite," the judge suggested and DeMille
agreed that stone or granite tablets produced by local Minnesota granite
companies would be "more suitable." Various local chapters or "aeries" of
the Eagles paid for the stone monuments and donated them as part of
the youth guidance program in several local and state governments, in-
cluding Colorado.




113. The Colorado Supreme Court applied the Lemon test as modified by the Supreme
Court's decision in Allegheny. Id. at 1023.
114. Id. at 1019.
115. 483 F. Supp. 272, 274 (D.N.D. 1980) (noting that when a statute requires public
schools to post a copy of the Ten Commandments, "[t]here is not even a pretense
of a secular purpose in the statute or in the defendants' compliance with the
statute").
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Circuit holding in Anderson.116 The court distinguished Stone and
Ring because those cases considered state statutes which required
public school classrooms to post copies of the Ten Commandments.
The Colorado Supreme Court determined that Establishment Clause
standards in schools "require a more stringent analysis because of the
age of the minds affected, and because students are captive audiences,
especially susceptible to influence." 117
The court concluded that the monument did not have the effect of
endorsing religion because of the other, much larger monuments in
the vicinity. The court also held that the reasonable observer would
note the immediate context of the monument-the many other dis-
plays and monuments in the area-and find the park was more of a
"museum setting which, 'though not neutralizing the religious content
of a religious [item], negates any message of endorsement of that con-
tent."'118 The intent of the Eagles, coupled with the context of the
message, allowed the Colorado monument to pass constitutional
muster.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in Books v. City of Elk-
hart,ll9 gave the third ruling on a monument donated by the Eagles.
In May of 1958, the city of Elkhart, Indiana allowed a monument,
slightly larger than that in Plattsmouth's park, to be placed on the
lawn in front of the city's municipal building. The municipal building
lawn also contained two war memorials. 12 0 Almost forty years later,
the plaintiffs sued to remove the monument as a violation of the First
Amendment.121 The court first examined the monument's history and
found that town representatives and three members of the clergy were
present at the monument's dedication ceremony. 122 The clergy chal-
lenged those in attendance to accept the Ten Commandments in order
116. See supra notes 100-05.
117. Freedom From Religion Found., 898 P.2d at 1023.
118. Id. at 1025 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692 (1984)).
119. 235 F.3d 292 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1058 (2001). A different Sev-
enth Circuit panel found another Eagles monument unconstitutional in Indiana
Civil Liberties Union v. O'Bannon, 259 F.3d 766, 770 (7th Cir. 2001), cert. denied,
534 U.S. 1162 (2002). More recently, a divided panel of the Seventh Circuit found
that a city's sale of a parcel of land on which a Ten Commandments monument
stood did not violate the Establishment Clause. Mercier v. Fraternal Order of
Eagles, 395 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 2005). The United States District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana recently found that an Eagles monument, which
stands on the state capitol grounds, does not violate the Establishment Clause.
Russelburg v. Gibson County, No. 3:03-CV-149-RLY-WGH, 2005 WL 2175527
(S.D. Ind. Sept. 7, 2005).
120. Books, 235 F.3d at 295-96.
121. Id. at 297.
122. Id. at 295 (citing THE ELKHART TRUTH, May 31, 1958, at 1). Reverend W.W.
Kendall, outgoing president of the Elkhart Ministerial Association; Father Wil-
liam Gieranowski, assistant pastor of St. Vincent's Catholic Church; and Rabbi
M.E. Finkelstein of Temple Israel each gave a brief challenge. Id.
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to provide redemption from strife and fear, to engrave the Ten Com-
mandments upon their hearts, and to dedicate their lives to the high
ideals inherent in American life.123 Before trial, the city's Common
Council passed a resolution stating that the structure was "a histori-
cal and cultural monument that reflects one of the earliest codes of
human conduct."124
The Seventh Circuit found that the monument violated the first
and second prongs of the Lemon test. 125 The court's first finding fore-
shadowed its conclusion: "[als a starting point, we do not think it can
be said that the Ten Commandments, standing by themselves, can be
stripped of their religious, indeed sacred, significance and character-
ized as a moral or ethical document."126 The court ignored the city's
resolution and instead placed significance on the messages of the
three clergy who spoke at the monument's dedication. The court
found that the city's purpose was to "urge the people of Elkhart to
embrace the specific religious code of conduct taught in the Ten
Commandments."'127
The court also found that the reasonable observer would believe
that the monument had the principle or primary effect of advancing
religion because it was placed at the seat of government, the munici-
pal building.t 28 The monument was an impermissible endorsement of
religion "'because City Hall is so plainly under government ownership
and control, every display and activity in the building is implicitly
marked with the stamp of government approval.'"'129 The religious
message at the dedication ceremony and placement of the monument
at the seat of government precipitated the Seventh Circuit's holding
that the monument was unconstitutional.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals heard the fourth objection to
an Eagles monument in Summum v. City of Ogden.130 In 1966, the
city allowed an Eagles monument, very similar to Plattsmouth's, to be
placed on the lawn outside the city's municipal building.13t The lawn
also contained a memorial to a police officer, a tree from a sister city,
and a plaque. Followers of the Summum religion132 sued the city, and
123. Id.
124. Id. at 297.
125. The Books court applied the Lemon test as modified by Allegheny and examined
whether the monument had the purpose or effect of endorsing religion. Id. at
302-04.
126. Id. at 302.
127. Id. at 303.
128. Id. at 306.
129. Id. at 305 (quoting Am. Jewish Cong. v. City of Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 128 (7th
Cir. 1987)).
130. 297 F.3d 995 (10th Cir. 2002).
131. Id. at 997.
132. Before they brought suit to remove the Ten Commandments monument, follow-
ers of the Summum religion proposed adding their own monument bearing the
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alleged the monument violated the Establishment Clause and the
First Amendment's Free Speech Clause. 133 The district court applied
the Tenth Circuit's decision in Anderson 134 and granted summary
judgment for the city on both claims. 13 5 The plaintiffs appealed the
decision. During oral argument before the court of appeals, the plain-
tiffs' counsel conceded that, absent an en banc reconsideration of An-
derson, the Tenth Circuit panel could not reverse the district court
ruling on the plaintiffs' Establishment Clause claim. This concession
prompted the court of appeals to ignore the plaintiffs' Establishment
Clause argument, although it indicated in a footnote that it would
have considered that claim because of the Supreme Court's decision in
Stone and the Tenth Circuit's decision in Summum v. Callaghan.136
The court then reversed the district court's decision which granted
summary judgment on the plaintiffs' free speech claim.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Adland v. Russ,1 37 took the
fifth opportunity to review the municipal display of an Eagles Ten
Commandments monument. The Eagles donated the monument in
the 1950s and it stood on the grounds of the Kentucky state capitol
until 1980, when it was removed for the capitol's renovation.138 On
April 21, 2000, Governor Paul E. Patton signed into law Senate Joint
Resolution Number 57 which directed the Department for Facilities
Management:
[R]elocate the monument inscribed with the Ten Commandments which was
displayed on the Capitol grounds for nearly three decades to a permanent site
on the Capitol grounds near Kentucky's floral clock to be made part of a his-
torical and cultural display including the display of this order to remind Ken-
tuckians of the Biblical foundations of the laws of the Commonwealth. 13 9
Seven Principles of Summum. Id. at 998. The Seven Principles of Summum are:
the Principle of Psychokinesis; the Principle of Correspondence; the Principle of
Vibration; the Principle of Opposition; the Principle of Rhythm; the Principle of
Cause and Effect; and the Principle of Gender. Id. at 998 n.2. The plaintiffs did
not claim that the Seven Principles of Summum were foundational to United
States law. Id. at 998-99.
133. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of
speech. .. ."). Summum alleged that display of the Ten Commandments while
refusing to display the Seven Principles of Summum monument violates Sum-
mum's right to free speech. Summum, 297 F.3d at 999.
134. See supra notes 100-05 and accompanying text.
135. The district court found that the city had adopted the speech of the various monu-
ments on the municipal grounds as its own and adding a Summum monument
would allow Summum to dictate the city's expression. Summum, 297 F.3d at 999.
136. 130 F.3d 906 (10th Cir. 1997) (finding that the plaintiffs had alleged facts suffi-
cient to state claim under the Free Speech Clause and remanding for further
proceedings). The court also indicated that it would have considered the plain-
tiffs' claims even if Anderson was still good law because each Establishment
Clause case is decided upon its unique facts. Summum, 297 F.3d at 1000 n.3.
137. 307 F.3d 471 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 999 (2003).
138. Id. at 476.
139. Id. at 474-75.
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The resolution's preamble included seventeen clauses reciting the
Kentucky Senate's purposes in enacting the resolution.140 The cul-
tural display was to include a thirty-four foot floral clock, the Eagles'
monument, and seven other memorials, plaques, or markers to re-
member various historical events. Shortly after the resolution was
signed, the plaintiffs141 sued to enjoin the state from erecting the
monument. 142 The district court found that the monument was un-
constitutional under all three prongs of the Lemon test. 143
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit evaluated the monument under the
Lemon test.14 4 The court, like the Seventh Circuit in Books, quoted
heavily from Stone and concluded that the legislature's avowed pur-
pose was insufficient, by itself, to satisfy the secular purpose require-
ment. The court then considered the language of the resolution and
the intended physical context of the monument. The court found the
language of the resolution impermissibly focused only on the Biblical
foundations of Kentucky law: "[slection 7 of the Resolution states that
the Commonwealth considers the Ten Commandments 'to be the pre-
cedent legal code of the Commonwealth.'"145 The court also found
that the monument's great stature in comparison to the other smaller
markers suggested "that they are secondary in importance to the Ten
Commandments .... "146
140. Id. at 476. Several of the clauses were dedicated to quotes from Samuel Adams,
Fisher Ames, George Washington, Andrew Jackson, John Quincy Adams, Abigail
Adams, Woodrow Wilson, and Jimmy Carter affirming their beliefs in God, the
Bible, or Christianity. Id.
141. "The named plaintiffs include Rabbi Jonathon Adland, Reverend Johanna Bos,
Reverend James Greenlee, Reverend Gilbert Schroerlucke, Jeff Vessels, and the
American Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky (ACLU)." Adland v. Russ, 107 F.
Supp. 2d 782, 784 (E.D. Ky. 2000).
142. Id. at 783.
143. Id. at 785-87.
144. Adland, 307 F.3d at 479. The dissent argued that the claim was not ripe for
adjudication because it did not satisfy any of the Sixth Circuit's requirements in
Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of Am. v. Magaw, 132 F.3d 272, 284 (6th Cir. 1997): "[A] likeli-
hood that the harm complained of will actually occur; that the record is suffi-
ciently developed to make the case fit for judicial resolution; and that the parties
will suffer hardship if relief is denied." Adland, 307 F.3d at 492-94.
145. Adland, 307 F.3d at 481 (quoting S.J. Res. 57, 2000 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2000)). The
court acknowledged that it has
[N]either the desire nor the authority to resolve disputes about whether
the Commonwealth's legal system owes more to the Magna Carta or the
Code of Hammurabi than the Ten Commandments. But that said, in
addressing the Commonwealth's avowed secular purpose for displaying
an overtly religious symbol such as the Ten Commandments, we cannot
ignore the Commonwealth's adoption of a view that emphasizes a single
religious influence to the exclusion of all other religious and secular
influences.
Id. at 481-82.
146. Id. at 482.
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The Six Circuit also determined that the monument impermissibly
endorsed religion to the objective observer. The court compared the
monument to the religious displays in Allegheny and found that:
(1) the Commonwealth intends to display a document that is inherently relig-
ious; (2) the display will be on the grounds of the State Capitol; (3) the format
of the monument emphasizes the Commandments' religious directives; (4) the
Ten Commandments monument will be the largest monument in the display;
(5) the intended "cultural and historical display" set forth in Section 8 lacks a
readily discernable unifying theme; and, (6) the Resolution, which will be
posted with the monument, tends to amplify the religious message .... 147
The Sixth Circuit then affirmed the district court ruling because the
monument violated the purpose and effects prongs of the Lemon test.
III. ACLU OF NEBRASKA FOUNDATION v. CITY
OF PLATTSMOUTH
From this mountain of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the
Eighth Circuit, en banc, considered another Eagles monument in
ACLU of Nebraska Foundation v. City of Plattsmouth (Plattsmouth
11.148 The ACLU Nebraska Foundation and John Doe, 149 a resident of
Plattsmouth, alleged that the city's display of a Ten Commandments
monument violated the Establishment Clause.150 The text of the Ten
Commandments151 dominates the face of the approximately five-foot
tall by three-foot wide granite structure. 15 2 Above the text are two
small tablets with the Ten Commandments engraved in Semitic
script, an eye within a triangle, and an eagle gripping a flag. 153 Below
the text are two six-point stars, the intertwined symbols of chi and
rho, and a small round scroll recognizing the monument as a gift from
the Plattsmouth Aerie.15 4
The monument stands in Memorial Park, the city's largest public
park, more than ten blocks away from Plattsmouth City Hall.155 The
monument stands under a large tree in the corner of the park several
147. Id. at 489 (citation omitted).
148. 419 F.3d 772 (8th Cir. 2005).
149. See supra note 15.
150. Plattsmouth 11, 419 F.3d at 772.
151. See discussion supra Part I.
152. Plattsmouth 11, 419 F.3d at 773.
153. ACLU Found. v. City of Plattsmouth, 358 F.3d 1020, 1025 (8th Cir. 2004). The
court did not determine the exact origin of the Semitic script engraved in the
small tablets, it only noted that "for the purposes of this discussion it matters
only that they purport to be a replica of the original Ten Commandments." Id. at
1025 n.2. The pyramid containing an eye is similar to that seen on the back of a
dollar bill and is also referred to as the 'all-seeing eye." Id. at 1025 n.3.
154. Id. at 1025. According to the court, the six-point star, commonly known as the
Star of David, is a reference to the Jewish Religion. Id. at 1025 n.4. Further, the
court noted that "[tihe Greek letters 'chi' and 'rho' are used to symbolize the
Christian religion." Id. at 1025 n.5.
155. Id. at 1025.
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hundred feet from the parking lot, on a grassy knoll. The knoll sits
between a recreation area containing a barbeque grill, benches, picnic
tables, and a permanent shelter, and Fourth Avenue, the adjacent
street.15 6 No other statues or monuments with historic or legal merit
are visible within the immediate vicinity of the monument.157 The
front or text side of the monument faces Fourth Avenue, away from
the recreation area. The monument is visible to motorists and pedest-
rians, but one must enter the park to read the text of the monu-
ment.158 The monument does not require any regular maintenance
except mowing around its concrete base.159
Except for a few incidental details, the installation of the monu-
ment remains a mystery. No contemporaneous city resolutions, min-
utes, proclamations, or other records survive from the period as
evidence of the process used to install the monument.160 When the
court made its decision, it knew only the following: the monument was
donated in 1965; it was donated by the Plattsmouth aerie; the Eagles
are a national philanthropic and community organization; the Eagles
chose the text and symbols which were engraved on the monument;
the version of the Ten Commandments is an amalgam of those used in
Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish religions; Art Hellwig, Street Com-
missioner of the city in 1965, other city employees, employees of Con-
sumers Public Power, and employees of W.E. Cady, Inc., erected the
monument; and Hellwig was an officer of the Eagles at the time, but it
was unclear whether the city employees were acting in their official or
personal capacities.161 As for the city's present purpose for retaining
the monument, the city administrator at the time of the suit, John G.
Winkler, stated as follows:
The Fraternal Order of Eagles has been for many years a valued organization
in Plattsmouth and has contributed in many ways to our city through its phil-
anthropic and community-enhancing activities. Although neither I nor any
current member of city government were serving in that capacity in 1965, it is
safe to assume that the Eagles monument which is the subject of this lawsuit
156. Id.; Winkler Affidavit, supra note 2, IT 4, 6. At the time of the suit Winkler was
the chair of the Plattsmouth city council and submitted an affidavit on behalf of
the Defendants. Id. at 1 1.
157. ACLU Neb. Found. v. City of Plattsmouth, 186 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1027 (D. Neb.
2002).
158. Plattsmouth, 358 F.3d at 1025. Also, those hoping to avoid or view the monument
are not permitted to park on 4th Avenue in front of the monument. Winkler Affi-
davit, supra note 2, 6.
159. Plattsmouth, 358 F.3d at 1025-26. At some time after the commencement of liti-
gation, the monument was toppled over and city employees re-erected it. Id. at
1026.
160. Id.
161. Id.; see also Religious Monument Brings ACLU, PLATTsMouTH J., July 13, 2000,
at 1.
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was accepted by the city and placed in Memorial Park out of gratitude to the
Eagles for their civic work.162
The city must give its permission before something may be placed
on public property. However, there are no formal policies which gov-
ern the acceptance process and applications are decided on a case by
case basis. 163 Through the years, the city allowed pieces of recrea-
tional equipment or structures from local fraternal groups, clubs, or
individuals to be scattered throughout the park. Most of these objects
bear plaques identifying their donors.164
The individual plaintiff, John Doe,165 is a resident and taxpayer of
Plattsmouth who frequently came into unwelcome contact with the
monument while driving to and from his home.166 Doe testified that
he avoided using the park for recreational activities except when a
scheduled event required his attendance.' 6 7 When he did attend an
event, Doe avoided the corner of the park where the monument is lo-
cated.16s Doe said he would use the park more often were it not for the
monument. Doe, a professed atheist, believed that the monument
"calls for [his] death and the death of billions of people."16 9 The ACLU
Nebraska Foundation, of which Doe is a member, participated in the
action to assert the rights and interests of its twelve local members,
including those of Doe.17 0 The plaintiffs sued to remove the monu-
ment as a violation of the United States Constitution, federal law,171
and also article I, section 4 of the Nebraska Constitution.17 2
162. Winkler Affidavit, supra note 2, 14.
163. Plattsmouth, 358 F.3d at 1026.
164. Id. at 1026; Winkler Affidavit, supra note 2, 7-10. In Memorial Park, only
three other plaques give honor to donors: a plaque on the picnic shelter donated
by the Lions Club; a plaque on the grill donated by a deceased man; and a plaque
at the entrance of the park listing the names of donors who gave to the construc-
tion of the park. Plaintiffs'-Appellants' Brief at 4, Plattsmouth, 358 F.3d 1020
(No. 02-2444) [hereinafter Plaintiffs' Brief].
165. See supra note 15.
166. Plattsmouth, 358 F.3d at 1026.
167. Id.
168. Plaintiffs' Brief, supra note 164, at 5-6.
169. Defendants'-Appellants' Brief at 7-8, Plattsmouth, 358 F.3d 1020 (No. 02-2444)
[hereinafter Defendants' Brief].
170. Plattsmouth, 358 F.3d at 1026.
171. Violations of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution may be re-
dressed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
172. That section states as follows:
All persons have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty
God according to the dictates of their own consciences. No person shall
be compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship against his
consent, and no preference shall be given by law to any religious society,
nor shall any interference with the rights of conscience be permitted. No
religious test shall be required as a qualification for office, nor shall any
person be incompetent to be a witness on account of his religious beliefs;
but nothing herein shall be construed to dispense with oaths and affir-
mations. Religion, morality, and knowledge, however, being essential to
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The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska en-
tered summary judgment for the plaintiffs.173 The Honorable Richard
G. Kopf first found that Doe had standing to bring the claim because
he suffered an injury in fact:174 "he has curtailed his use of Memorial
Park because of the presence of the monument, and there is no reason
to disbelieve him."175 The ACLU had standing to bring the suit "be-
cause it represent[ed] Doe and he has standing."176
After applying the Lemon test, 177 the court rejected the city's cur-
rent purpose because there was "scant evidentiary support for [its] as-
sertions" 178 and because in Stone and Books "the focus is properly on
the primary purpose for display of the Ten Commandments, not
whether some secular purpose, however secondary or speculative, can
be articulated."179 The court found that the monument had the im-
permissible effect of endorsing religion because the "edifice, proclaim-
ing 'I AM the LORD thy God,' is a centerpiece of a significant public
place"1 8 0 and "nothing about the physical setting of the monument ne-
gates the endorsement effect of displaying the religious message of
and religious symbols inscribed on the Ten Commandments monu-
ment. On the contrary, the endorsement effect is magnified."18 1 The
district court entered judgment and later awarded attorneys fees.18 2
good government, it shall be the duty of the Legislature to pass suitable
laws to protect every religious denomination in the peaceable enjoyment
of its own mode of public worship, and to encourage schools and the
means of instruction.
NEB. CONST. art I, § 4.
173. ACLU Neb. Found. v. City of Plattsmouth, 186 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1036 (D. Neb.
2002). The district court dismissed the claim under the Nebraska Constitution
because it was barely addressed by the parties and there was no state law di-
rectly on point. Id. at 1030.
174. The district court applied the higher standard of an "injury in fact." Id. at
1030-31. See, e.g., Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. Zielke, 845 F.2d 1463
(7th Cir. 1988) (dismissing the plaintiffs' claim as without standing because they
did not alter their behavior to avoid the religious symbol).
175. Plattsmouth, 186 F. Supp. 2d at 1031.
176. Id. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975) (stating that organizations
have standing if they allege that their members "are suffering immediate or
threatened injury as a result of the challenged action").
177. Judge Kopf "confine[d] [his] discussion to the first two prongs of the Lemon test,
as modified by the Allegheny endorsement test." Plattsmouth, 186 F. Supp. 2d at
1031.
178. Id. at 1033.
179. Id. at 1034.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1035.
182. ACLU Neb. Found. v. City of Plattsmouth, 199 F. Supp. 2d 964 (D. Neb. 2002).
Judge Kopf also proposed his own solution: "[11f I had a choice, and rather than
decide this case, I would gently require that the parties and their talented law-
yers eat a meal together, and then amicably resolve this easily resolvable case."
Plattsmouth, 186 F. Supp. 2d at 1035. Perhaps they should barbeque in Platts-
mouth's park.
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A divided panel of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
district court's decision.' 8 3 The panell 8 4 concluded that both plain-
tiffs had standing to bring an Establishment Clause claiml85 and de-
termined that the monument should be evaluated under the Lemon
test as modified by the endorsement test,18 6 rather than the strict
scrutiny standard of Larson v. Valente.187 In order for Plattsmouth to
pass the "purpose" prong, the panel required the city to articulate "a
secular purpose."' 8 8 In the panel's eyes, the purpose prong did not
require that the purpose
be unrelated to religion-that would amount to a requirement that the gov-
ernment show callous indifference to religious groups, and the Establishment
Clause has never been so interpreted. Rather, Lemon's 'purpose' requirement
aims at preventing the relevant governmental decisionmaker ... from aban-
doning neutrality and acting with the intent of promoting a particular point of
view in religious matters.
1 8 9
183. ACLU Neb. Found. v. City of Plattsmouth, 358 F.3d 1020, 1042 (8th Cir. 2004).
184. Judge Kermit E. Bye wrote for the two to one majority. Id. at 1024. Judge Rich-
ard S. Arnold concurred in the judgment, but wrote separately to reflect his belief
that the monument was invalid under the Larson test. Id. at 1043 (Arnold, J.,
concurring in judgment).
185. Id. at 1026-31 (majority opinion). Arguments for and against the plaintiffs'
standing are beyond the scope of this Note. For an argument on why plaintiffs
should not have standing to challenge the "feeling of exclusion occasioned by the
recognition that a religious majority," because it is a byproduct of democracy, see
Noah Feldman, From Liberty to Equality: The Transformation of the Establish-
ment Clause, 90 CAL. L. REV. 673, 709-12 (2002); Jesse H. Choper, Beyond Sepa-
ratism: Church and State: The Endorsement Test: Its Status and Desirability, 18
J.L. & POL. 499, 522-23 (2002) (arguing that in a pluralistic culture some beliefs
will receive recognition in our nations laws and some will not; plaintiff should not
have standing to address this inequality); David Harvey, It's Time to Make
Non-Economic Standing Take a Seat in "Religious Display" Cases, 40 DuQ. L.
REV. 313, 321 (2002) (arguing that plaintiff should have to assert some type of
"palpable injury from the plaque"); Marc Rohr, Titling at Crosses: Nontaxpayer
Standing to Sue Under the Establishment Clause, 11 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 495
(1995) (describing the Establishment Clause standing requirements under Su-
preme Court and Circuit precedent).
186. Plattsmouth, 358 F.3d at 1034. Justice O'Connor created the endorsement test as
an enhancement for the first two prongs of the Lemon test through her concur-
rence in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
187. Plattsmouth, 358 F.3d. at 1032. Under Larson, a statute is subject to strict scru-
tiny if it discriminates on its face. Strict scrutiny, although argued by Plaintiffs
in their brief, was not applicable because the challenged government activity did
not create a "practical, tangible benefit or burden for adherents of a specific relig-
ion." Id. at 1033. See, e.g., Sklar v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 282 F.3d 610
(9th Cir. 2002); Wilson v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 920 F.2d 1282 (6th Cir.
1990).
188. Plattsmouth, 358 F.3d at 1035 (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 681 n.6).
189. Id. (quoting Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Lat-
ter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987)).
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The court first considered whether Plattsmouth had a secular purpose
when it installed the monument and then considered whether Platts-
mouth had a secular purpose when it decided to keep the monument.
Although records of the monument's receipt and installation were
absent from the proceedings, the panel found "undisputed evidence of
Plattsmouth's purpose in accepting, erecting, and maintaining the
monument... in the content and context of the monument itself."190
The panel determined that the content, and therefore the monument's
message, was "undeniably religious"19 1 and found nothing in the set-
ting that would detract from the monument's religious content. Next,
the panel rejected the city administrator's affidavit, which presented
Plattsmouth's purported purpose for the monument's installation, as
"counter to the undisputed evidence."192 The panel found that the
"Eagles donated this monument as a part of its nationwide campaign
to spread its version of the Ten Commandments."19 3 Consequently,
"Plattsmouth's purpose in erecting it was nothing more complex than
the adoption of that goal." 19 4 Finally, the panel rejected Platts-
mouth's arguments concerning the cost of removal, artistic value, and
historic preservation, holding that these justifications were "but a pre-
text for keeping the monument on public land without a secularizing
context."195 Therefore, the panel determined that the monument
failed the purpose prong of the Lemon test and violated the Establish-
ment Clause.
The panel also considered whether the monument's primary effect
was to advance or inhibit religion according to the reasonable ob-
server, a hypothetical person "more informed about the monument
and its history than are uninformed passers-by." 19 6 The court ana-
190. Id. at 1036. The court derived this standard from Books, even though, unlike
Books, no record of religious ceremonies survived from the monument's installa-
tion. Id.
191. Id. See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980) (per curiam) ("The Ten Com-
mandments are undeniably a sacred text in the Jewish and Christian faiths, and
no legislative recitation of a supposed secular purpose can blind us to that fact.");
see also City of Elkhart v. Books, 532 U.S. 1058, 1058 (2001) (Stevens, J., opinion
respecting denial of certiorari) ([The phrase] "I AM the LORD thy God . . .is
rather hard to square with the proposition that the monument expresses no par-
ticular religious preference-particularly when considered in conjunction with
... [the fact) that the monument also depicts two Stars of David and a symbol
composed of the Greek letter Chi and Rho superimposed on each other that re-
present Christ.").
192. Plattsmouth, 358 F.3d at 1037.
193. Cf supra note 109.
194. Id. The court did not consider the most systematic explanation of the Eagles' pur-
pose in donating the monuments. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
195. Id. at 1039.
196. Id. at 1040. See Books, 235 F.3d at 306; see also Capitol Square Review & Advi-
sory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 779-81 (1995) (O'Conner, J., concurring). The
Eighth Circuit considers the endorsement question as part of Lemon's effects
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lyzed the monument under the Supreme Court's decisions in Lynch
and Allegheny 197 and, like the Sixth and Seventh Circuits, demanded
a common theme before the monument could be classified as part of
the city's cultural heritage.198 From the panel's perspective, "[t]he
reasonable viewer would perceive this monument as an attempt by
Plattsmouth to steer its citizens in the direction of mainstream
Judeo-Christian religion. This it cannot do."199 Finally, the panel
found that the monument did more than acknowledge God-that it
also served as "an instruction from the Judeo-Christian God on how
He requires His followers to live."200 Therefore, the panel determined
that the monument had the unconstitutional purpose and effect of en-
dorsing religion. 2 0 1
Shortly after the panel published its decision, the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals granted Plattsmouth's petition for review and va-
cated the panel's decision. 2 02 The court, sitting en banc, heard oral
argument in fall of 2004, but did not make its decision until after the
United States Supreme Court's decisions in Van Orden and McCreary
County. After reviewing the plurality opinion and Justice Breyer's
concurring opinion in Van Orden, the court determined that Van
Orden governed Plattsmouth's monument. 20 3 In a ten to two hold-
prong unlike other Circuits which have created a whole new endorsement test to
replace the Lemon test. Compare Plattsmouth, 358 F.3d at 1040 n.10, with
Freethought Soc'y v. Chester County, 334 F.3d 247, 250 (3d Cir. 2003).
The panel's reasonable observer was aware of the monument's history and the
history of the Eagles' national project; would know that city employees partici-
pated in erecting the monument in 1965 and again in 2001; would recognize the
Ten Commandments as sacred to the Judeo-Christian and Islamic religions and
would understand the significance of the symbols on the monument; would know
that other donated items in the park did not display a religious message; would
be aware that Plattsmouth offered its purpose over thirty-five years after the
monument was erected; and would know that the reasonable observer does not
have to accept the city's explanation for allowing the monument to remain.
Plattsmouth, 358 F.3d at 1040.
197. Plattsmouth, 358 F.3d at 1041.
198. Id. See Books, 235 F.3d at 306; Adland v. Russ, 307 F.3d 471, 483-84 (6th Cir.
2001) (requiring a "discernible unifying theme").
199. Plattsmouth, 358 F.3d at 1042. One of the few courts to rely on Marsh was the
Third Circuit. See Freethought Soc'y, 334 F.3d at 265-66 (applying the historical
precedents test to a Ten Commandments monument affixed to a county
courthouse).
200. Plattsmouth, 358 F.3d at 1042.
201. Judge Pasco M. Bowman II concurred in the panel's decision to apply the Lemon
test but dissented from its decision. The reasoning of that dissent is omitted from
this Note because Judge Bowman authored the en banc court's majority opinion.
See id. at 1043 (Bowman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
202. ACLU Neb. Found. v. City of Plattsmouth, No. 02-2444 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS
6636 (8th Cir. Apr. 6, 2004), reh'g granted and opinion vacated.




ing,204 the court reversed the decision of the panel and district court.
The court found two similarities between Plattsmouth's monument
and the monument in Van Orden. First, both monuments make a
"passive-and permissible-use" of the text of the Ten Command-
ments to acknowledge the role of religion and God in our nation's heri-
tage2 05 and, second, both monuments had stood without question for
decades. 20 6
The court identified four reasons behind the first conclusion. First,
the court noted that passive acknowledgments of the Ten Command-
ments were present on prominent government buildings such as the
Library of Congress, the National Archives, the Department of Jus-
tice, the Court of Appeals for the District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia, and the United States House of Representatives. 20 7 Second,
the court considered the Supreme Court's decisions acknowledging the
role of religion in United States history.208 Third, the court consid-
ered recent Supreme Court decisions that directly or indirectly recog-
nized the role of religion in the nation's life. 2 09 Finally, the court
considered Van Orden's requirement that it neither "abdicate [its] re-
sponsibility to maintain a division between church and state nor
evince a hostility to religion by disabling the government from in some
ways recognizing our religious heritage."2 10
The court reversed the panel's decision and declared that Platts-
mouth's monument was not different "in any constitutionally signifi-
cant way from Texas's display of a similar monument in Van
Orden."2 11 Shortly after the Eighth Circuit's decision, the ACLU de-
cided not to appeal to the United States Supreme Court.2 1 2 Platts-
mouth's saga appears to be over.
204. Thirteen judges originally heard the case, but Richard Sheppard Arnold died on
September 23, 2004. The remaining twelve judges decided the case. Id. at 776
n.1.
205. Id. at 776-77.
206. Id. at 778.
207. Id. at 777.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 778 (quoting Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2859 (2005) (plurality
opinion)).
211. Plattsmouth 11, 419 F.3d at 778.
212. The ACLU Nebraska Foundation unanimously decided not to appeal the Eighth
Circuit en banc's decision to the United States Supreme Court. ACLU director
Tim Butz commented that the ACLU "was just out of options . . . ." Nelson
Lampe, State ACLU Votes to End Fight, LINCOLN J. STAR, Sept. 28, 2005, at B1.
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IV. THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT EN BANC PROPERLY PERMITTED
PLATTSMOUTH'S EAGLES MONUMENT TO SOAR
OVER THE MOUNTAIN
The Eighth Circuit en banc correctly held in Plattsmouth II that
the Eagles' monument does not offend the Establishment Clause. The
evidence clearly proved that Plattsmouth did not establish monothe-
ism as its official religion when it allowed the monument to be in-
stalled.2 13 In order to analyze the Plattsmouth II decision, this Part
will consider the new test presented in Van Orden and applied by the
Eighth Circuit in Plattsmouth I. It will then argue that the Eighth
Circuit could have allowed the city to keep its monument even under a
traditional Lemon test analysis including the heightened "purpose" re-
quirement from the Supreme Court's holding in McCreary County. Fi-
nally, this Part argues that the Supreme Court should create a
"grandfather clause" to exempt the Eagles' monuments from the typi-
cal Establishment Clause analysis.
A. The Eighth Circuit En Banc Correctly Keeps the Eagles'
Monument Grounded
The Van Orden plurality and Justice Breyer's concurrence have es-
tablished a new test that will allow lower courts to permit religious
displays, especially the Eagles' Ten Commandments monuments.
This section melts down the main elements of the opinions which ren-
dered judgment in Van Orden to provide a framework for future argu-
ment concerning religious displays. The Van Orden test has four
main elements for a religious display: (1) it must be passive to be per-
missible; (2) it must be recognized in the United States' historical tra-
dition; (3) it must have its own historical tradition; and (4) it must
have at least one secular purpose.
First, the display must be passive to be permissible. This means
that a display of the Ten Commandments must be "a far more passive
use" of the Ten Commandments than a mandatory display in elemen-
tary schoolrooms. 2 14 The Supreme Court will likely find that a dis-
play is a passive recognition of religion if it has similar characteristics
to one or more of the following. First, a display is passive if a citizen
such as the petitioner in Van Orden, who disagrees so strongly with
213. ACLU Neb. Found. v. City of Plattsmouth, 358 F.3d 1020, 1039 (8th Cir. 2004),
rev'd, 419 F.3d 772 (8th Cir. 2005) ("By expressing a religious truth, Plattsmouth
began establishing religion in 1965 when it installed its monument.").
214. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2864 (plurality opinion). See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S.
39 (1980) (per curiam) (holding unconstitutional a Kentucky law which required
schools to post a copy of the Ten Commandments in their classrooms). See Tarik
Abdel-Monem, Note, Posting the Ten Commandments as a Historical Document
in Public Schools, 87 IowA L. REV. 1023, 1037-41 (2002) (noting the distinction
between the schoolchildren in the classroom and adults in the marketplace).
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the monument that he sued to compel its removal, can walk by it for
six years before filing suit.2 15 This consideration provides the best
empirical evidence of the religious display's impaci in the community,
especially on those who vehemently disagree with a religious display.
Second, a display is passive if it is comparable to similar depictions of
the religious symbols on significant government buildings such as the
United States Capitol, the Ronald Reagan Building, the Washington
Monument, the Jefferson Memorial, and the Lincoln Memorial. 2 16
This factor promotes a uniform application of the Constitution on both
federal and state actors. Third, a display is passive if it does not favor
any particular religious sect, promote religion over non-religion, com-
pel religious practice, or detour religious belief.2 17 This consideration
allows government to recognize religion's impact on our society but
prohibits it from promoting or compelling a particular belief. Finally,
physical location may also contribute to a passive use of a religious
text.2 18 This factor allows a court to consider the obvious-a religious
monument in the middle of the steps to the capitol communicates a
more overt message than one in the corner of a park.
The Eighth Circuit correctly compared the passive nature of
Plattsmouth's monument and its use of the Ten Commandments to
the monument in Van Orden.219 First, like the petitioner in Van
Orden, Doe observed the monument for some time before he brought
suit.220 Doe's own conduct speaks for itself. While an objector need
not call down fire and brimstone at the first sight of a religious dis-
play, he or she should challenge the display or, failing that, to accept
it. Second, the monument is engraved with the Ten Commandments,
religious symbols, and other non-religious symbols. Many of these
symbols appear on significant federal government buildings,221 but no
one would argue that the federal government established a monotheis-
tic religion. The Plattsmouth H court correctly compared the city's
monument to other passive and permissible displays of the Decalogue
on federal government buildings. Third, the Eagles specifically cre-
ated the text of the monument as a non-sectarian version of the Ten
Commandments.222 The Eagles' decision to create a new version of
215. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2858, 2864 (plurality opinion).
216. Id. at 2863 n.9.
217. Id. at 2870 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing School Dist. of Abington Twp. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring)).
218. Id.
219. ACLU Neb. Found. v. City of Plattsmouth (Plattsmouth H), 419 F.3d 772, 775
(8th Cir. 2005).
220. ACLU Neb. Found. v. City of Plattsmouth, 186 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1028-29 (D.
Neb. 2003).
221. See generally Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2862-63 (plurality opinion).
222. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
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the commandments points to a passive use of the Decalogue. 22 3 This
version does not steer the reader to one specific denomination, compel
religious practice, or promote a particular religious belief. Fourth,
Plattsmouth's monument stood in a corner of its forty-five-acre park,
facing away from the recreational equipment, picnic tables, benches,
and shelters. 2 24 Because of the monument's location, Doe would have
to make a special trip inside the park to read the text of the monu-
ment and observe its symbols.2 25 The park-goer finds the monument
among other items typically found in a park, including several dona-
tions from others in the community. These structures and equipment
each bear a plaque declaring the name of its donor. Therefore, the
Plattsmouth II court properly found that the monument passively dis-
played a religious text. Other counties, cities, and towns which seek
to keep their Eagles monument should, like Plattsmouth, point out its
passive nature and passive surroundings to support an argument that
the monument is permissible.
Second, the display's text must be recognized in the United States'
historical tradition. This factor is easy to satisfy when considering an
Eagles monument and other longstanding acts or displays which rec-
ognize religion. The Decalogue has "an unbroken history of official ac-
knowledgment by all three branches of government of the role of
religion in American life from at least 1789."226 More specifically, it is
chiseled on many prominent buildings,2 27 referenced in United States
Supreme Court opinions,228 honored in legislative resolutions, 22 9 and
praised in executive manuscripts. 2 30 These references give the Deca-
logue "an undeniable historical meaning.... "231 The Court's decision
allows government to continue its practice of recognizing the relation-
ship between the Ten Commandments and the law.2 32 The Court's
223. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
224. Plattsmouth 11, 419 F.3d at 774.
225. Plattsmouth, 186 F. Supp. 2d at 1028-29.
226. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2861 (plurality opinion). The plurality argued that all
nine Justices agreed to an extent and that '[elven the dissenters do not claim
that the First Amendment's 'Religion Clauses' forbid all governmental acknowl-
edgements, preferences, or accommodations of religion." Id. at 2860 n.3 (citing id.
at 2877 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 2894 n.4 (Souter, J., dissenting)).
227. Id. at 2862-63. The Court noted that passive acknowledgments of the Ten Com-
mandments were present on prominent government buildings such as the Li-
brary of Congress and National Archives, the Department of Justice, the Court of
Appeals for the District Court for the District of Columbia, and the United States
House of Representatives. Id.
228. Id. at 2863 (citing McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961)).
229. Id. (citing S. Con. Res. 13, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. Con. Res. 31, 105th Cong.
(1997)).
230. Id. (citing Public Papers of the Presidents, Harry S. Truman, 1950, at 157 (1965)).
231. Id.
232. Id. at 2869-70 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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typical Lemon analysis and commitment to neutrality without consid-
ering the nation's history would
lead to invocation or approval of results which partake not simply of that non-
interference and noninvolvement with the religious which the Constitution
commands, but of a brooding and pervasive devotion to the secular and a pas-
sive, or even active, hostility to the religious. 2 3 3
The Eighth Circuit properly observed similar historical traditions
in the text of Plattsmouth's monument. The court likened the city's
display to the national historical traditions. 23 4 Because there is no
problem with the federal government's decision to acknowledge the
Decalogue, states and their political subdivisions should be allowed to
make similar displays. Although Plattsmouth's display does not in-
clude seventeen other displays and twenty-one other monuments, 23 5
its display of an Eagles monument is proportionate to the town's size,
population, and historically significant organizations.
Third, the display must have its own historical tradition. This fac-
tor was not very important to the plurality, which only noted that the
petitioner walked by the monument for six years before bringing
suit.23 6 The plurality likely did not rely on the monument's tenure
because to do so would have undermined the dissent 2 37 in McCreary
County. However, Justice Breyer focused on the forty years which
passed between the monument's installation and the petitioner's chal-
lenge. To him, "those forty years suggest more strongly than can any
set of formulaic tests that few individuals, whatever their system of
beliefs, are likely to have understood the monument" as either encour-
aging or discouraging religion.2 38 Justice Breyer's opinion is best un-
derstood as what some may call a "grandfather clause"239 to the First
Amendment. As described above in section II.A, Breyer's opinion did
not offer a typical analysis of Texas's monument; rather, it allowed a
monument which the Court may not permit a government to erect to-
day.24 0 Breyer's grandfather clause functions to exempt historically
significant structures or actions specifically because of their historical
significance. Justice Breyer's vote allowed Texas to retain its monu-
233. Id. at 2869 (quoting Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 306
(1961)).
234. ACLU Neb. Found. v. City of Plattsmouth (Plattsmouth 11), 419 F.3d 772, 776-77
(8th Cir. 2005).
235. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2858 (plurality opinion).
236. Id. at 2864.
237. McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2748 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
238. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2870-71 (plurality opinion).
239. "A provision that creates an exemption from the law's effect for something that
existed before the law's effective date; specifically, a statutory or regulatory
clause that exempts a class of persons or transactions because of circumstances
existing before the new rule or regulation takes effect." BLAci's LAW DICTIONARY
718 (8th ed. 2004).
240. See id.
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ment; therefore, his analysis must be considered and potentially ar-
gued in order to prevail.2 41
The Plattsmouth II court correctly noted that the city's monument
stood in Memorial Park without objection for over thirty-five years.2 4 2
The Plattsmouth II court correctly found that the monument should be
grandfathered out of a Lemon analysis. The court compared the Van
Orden decision to another grandfather clause in Marsh v. Cham-
bers.2 43 In Marsh, the Court allowed Nebraska to continue its cen-
tury-old tradition of opening the legislative session with a prayer. The
Plattsmouth II court recognized the applicability of a grandfather
clause because of the monument's uninterrupted tenure in the park.
A government body which seeks to protect a religious display, and spe-
cifically an Eagles monument, should point out the display's tenure in
consideration of the potential of its exemption from Lemon.
Finally, the display must have at least one secular purpose, or
have no evidence of a religious one. Both the plurality and Justice
Breyer noted that there was no evidence in Van Orden which sug-
gested that Texas had a religious purpose when it installed and main-
tained the monument. 244 Justice Breyer was able to use his "legal
judgment"2 45 and conclude that the display did not violate the Consti-
tution because it did not have a religious purpose. The state's lack of a
religious purpose allowed the Court to distinguish other cases where
the government body displayed the Ten Commandments with a
"plainly religious," "pre-eminent purpose." 246 Conversely, the Su-
preme Court in McCreary County upheld the lower court's ruling be-
cause the counties did not have a secular purpose.2 4 7 By comparing
these two opinions, it is clear that strong evidence of a religious pur-
pose will convince a majority of the Court to remove the display with-
out further examination. The Van Orden Court was able to
241. Justice Breyer's concurrence may become a phenomenon similar to a concurrence
by Justice Powell in Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978) (Powell, J., concurring). Because Justice Powell cast the deciding fifth
vote in Bakke, lower courts decided cases based on his opinion. See, e.g., Talbert
v. City of Richmond, 648 F.2d 925 (4th Cir. 1981). Justice Breyer's opinion may
become a catalyst for similar discussion.
242. ACLU Neb. Found. v. City of Plattsmouth (Plattsmouth 11), 419 F.3d 772, 778
(8th Cir. 2005).
243. 463 U.S. 783 (1983). Those who have suggested that Marsh play a larger role in
Establishment Clause jurisprudence may see an answer to their prayers in Van
Orden and Plattsmouth. See Bell, supra note 29.
244. Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2864 (2005) (plurality opinion); id. at 2871
(Breyer, J., concurring).
245. Id. at 2869 (Breyer, J., concurring).
246. Id. at 2864 n.11 (plurality opinion) (quoting Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41
(1980) (per curiam)).
247. McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2735-37 (2005).
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distinguish McCreary County and avoid the purpose inquiry because
the record did not reflect the state's purpose.2 48
In Plattsmouth II, the court did not comment on Plattsmouth's pur-
pose, but chose to compare other portions of Van Orden to the city's
situation.2 4 9 However, if the court had considered the city's purpose,
it would have only found evidence to keep the monument. 250 The only
evidence of Plattsmouth's purpose when it allowed the monument to
be installed came from an affidavit by the city administrator. 251 In it,
he proffered several non-"sham" secular purposes including the his-
toric value of the monument, its beauty, and the cost of removal. The
Plattsmouth II court correctly observed that the city's monument has
more in common with the Ten Commandments display in Van Orden
than McCreary County. Other government bodies that seek to retain
religious displays should highlight the historical purpose and current
state of the display.
After careful examination of the opinions in Van Orden and Platts-
mouth II, it is evident that the Supreme Court etched a new test into
the Establishment Clause mountain. The Van Orden test set out four
main elements for maintaining a religious display: (1) it must be pas-
sive to be permissible; (2) it must be recognized in the United States'
historical tradition; (3) it must have its own historical tradition; and
(4) it must have a secular purpose. Even though Plattsmouth's ordeal
is over, other counties, cities, and towns in the United States should
argue under the framework of the Van Orden test to keep an Eagles
monument on public property.2 52
B. Plattsmouth's Eagles Monument Soars Over the
Mountains of Lemon and McCreary County
Even if the Eighth Circuit evaluated Plattsmouth's monument
under a traditional Lemon test analysis, including the Supreme
Court's enhanced purpose requirements in McCreary County,25 3 the
248. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. 2854 (plurality opinion).
249. ACLU Neb. Found. v. City of Plattsmouth (Plattsmouth II), 419 F.3d 772 (8th
Cir. 2005).
250. See supra section II.B.
251. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
252. See Twombly v. City of Fargo, 388 F. Supp. 2d 983 (D.N.D. 2005) (applying the
Van Orden test to permit Fargo to retain its Eagles monument).
253. McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2736 (2005). In his dissent, Justice
Scalia points out that the majority raised the secular purpose standard from a
secular purpose to a "heightened requirement that the secular purpose
'predominate' over any purpose to advance religion." Id. at 2757 (Scalia, J., dis-
senting). While I agree with his reasoning, a full discussion of the Supreme
Court's purpose requirement is beyond the scope of this Note. Therefore, I will
evaluate Plattsmouth's monument under the heightened McCreary County
standard.
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city would be allowed to keep its monument.2 54 The Lemon test re-
quires that a religious activity or display have a secular purpose, its
primary effect must neither advance nor inhibit religion, and it must
not foster an excessive entanglement between government and relig-
ion.2 55 Because the ACLU conceded that the monument did not foster
excessive governmental entanglement with religion, 256 this section
will limit this inquiry to the first two prongs of the test. Unlike the
Court's finding in McCreary County, Plattsmouth's display was not er-
ected or maintained with a mainly secular purpose nor did the city
proffer a "sham" 2 57 purpose during the lawsuit. The city's display
also does not have the effect of endorsing religion under a traditional
Lemon analysis. The monument does not endorse religion or bring
any benefit to religion. Therefore, the Eighth Circuit could have up-
held the monument under the Lemon test.
1. Plattsmouth's Purpose Surpasses the Lemon and McCreary
County Requirements for Purpose
The subjective nature of the purpose prong is one of the most im-
portant factors in determining a government entity's true purpose. 2 58
The purpose prong is designed to ask what the city subjectively in-
254. The court noted that it would have found that the monument was constitutional
under a traditional Lemon test analysis if required to do so. However, it did not
elaborate at length on its reasoning. Plattsmouth II, 419 F.3d at 778 n.8.
255. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). Several members of the Court
have criticized Lemon on other grounds. Justice Scalia offers the most poignant
criticism of Lemon:
Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in
its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried,
Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence once again,
frightening little children and school attorneys of Center Moriches
Union Free School District. Its most recent burial, only last Term, was,
to be sure, not fully six-feet under: our decision in Lee v. Weisman con-
spicuously avoided using the supposed "test" but also declined the invita-
tion to repudiate it. Over the years, however, no fewer than five of the
sitting Justices have, in their own opinions, personally driven pencils
through the creature's heart (the author of today's opinion repeatedly),
and a sixth has joined an opinion doing so.
Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993)
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (citations omitted).
256. ACLU Neb. Found. v. City of Plattsmouth, 358 F.3d 1020, 1026 (8th Cir. 2004),
rev'd, 419 F.3d 772 (8th Cir. 2005). Also, the Supreme Court appears to have
incorporated the entanglement prong into the effects test in Agostini v. Felton,
521 U.S. 203 (1997). Some argue that entanglement is only a problem if the relig-
ious activity or display advances or inhibits religion; therefore, the endorsement
test now covers all three original Lemon prongs. MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL, JOHN
H. GARvEy & THOMAS C. BERG, RELIC;ON AND THE CONSTITUTION 275-76 (2002).
257. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
258. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
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tends by the display. 259 Under McCreary County, a court should
honor the particular government entity's purported purpose unless it
finds an "unusual cas[e] where the claim was [1] an apparent sham or
[2] the secular purpose [was] secondary ... ."260 In this type of case, a
court should find that there was no "adequate secular object" com-
pared to a "predominately religious one."2 61 Under the McCreary
County standard, Plattsmouth's purpose was not a sham, nor was it
wholly secondary.
Plattsmouth's city administrator proffered several non-"sham" sec-
ular purposes in his affidavit 262 and the city's monument has more in
common with the Ten Commandments display in Van Orden than Mc-
Creary County. First, like Van Orden but unlike McCreary County,
the monument's historical context does not communicate a religious
purpose. Plattsmouth's monument has no contemporaneous records
from the monument's installation by which a court could determine
the city's purpose for erecting the monument. 26 3 Conversely, the Mc-
Creary County Court had much information regarding each county's
purpose. The Court's enhanced purpose requirement is predicated by
the counties' multiple displays of the Ten Commandments, 2 64 the
counties' resolutions which required the Ten Commandments to be
posted,26 5 and the religious ceremonies which accompanied the origi-
nal display's installation.2 66 The McCreary County Court held that
religious displays should be treated differently: "where one display
has a history manifesting sectarian purpose that the other lacks, it is
appropriate that they be treated differently, for the one display will be
properly understood as demonstrating a preference for one group of
259. See Lynch v. Donnelley, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The
purpose prong of Lemon asks whether government's actual purpose is to endorse
or disapprove of religion."). Because O'Connor's concurring opinion was adopted
by the majority in Allegheny, the endorsement test is often the proper inquiry
into both the purpose and effect prongs. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S.
523, 595 (1989). "Thus the endorsement test calls for enquiry into both the sub-
jective intention of the governmental 'speaker' and the 'objective' meaning of the
statement in the community." Feldman, supra note 185, at 695 (quoting Lynch,
465 U.S. at 690) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
260. McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2736 (2005).
261. Id.
262. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
263. ACLU Neb. Found. v. City of Plattsmouth, 358 F.3d 1020, 1026 (8th Cir. 2004),
rev'd, 419 F.3d 772 (8th Cir. 2005).
264. McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2736-37 (deciding that the Court should examine
all three displays of the Ten Commandments in order to determine the counties'
purpose).
265. Id. at 2728.
266. Id. at 2738 (determining that the counties intended a religious message because
the "county executive was accompanied by his pastor, who testified to the cer-
tainty of the existence of God").
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religious believers as against another."26 7 Where the McCreary
County Court found much evidence of the counties' religious purpose,
there is no evidence of the historical context of Plattsmouth's monu-
ment, save for an opinion by the current city administrator 2 68 and the
fact that the monument stood for thirty-five years without interrup-
tion. Because Plattsmouth's monument is so different in its historical
context from McCreary County, the Eighth Circuit could not have
found that Plattsmouth had a primarily religious purpose in erecting
or maintaining its monument.
The Plattsmouth II court could also have investigated the Eagles'
purpose when it donated the monuments, as found in State v. Freedom
From Religion Foundation, Inc. ,269 but it would find no religious pur-
pose that would justify the monument's removal. According to Free-
dom From Religion Foundation, the Eagles did not intend the
monuments "to be religious instruction of any kind" but rather to
"show ... youngsters that there were such recognized codes of behav-
ior to guide and help them."270 The Eagles' purpose should be inter-
preted as secular because courts have recognized that government has
a secular purpose when it encourages public decency, preservation of
moral standards and values of our society as a whole, or protection of
267. Id. at 2737 n.14.
268. That opinion is as follows:
The Fraternal Order of Eagles has been for many years a valued organi-
zation in Plattsmouth and has contributed in many ways to our city
through its philanthropic and community-enhancing activities. Al-
though neither I nor any current member of city government were serv-
ing in that capacity in 1965, it is safe to assume that the Eagles
monument which is the subject of this lawsuit was accepted by the city
and placed in Memorial Park out of gratitude to the Eagles for their civic
work.
Winkler Affidavit, supra note 2, % 14.
269. 898 P.2d 1013 (Colo. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1111 (1996). See supra notes
107-14 and accompanying text.
270. Freedom From Religion Found., 898 P.2d at 1024 n.16 (quoting Judge E.J.
Ruegemer). A former president of Harvard University could have used Judge
Ruegemer's advice to avoid the conclusions expressed in the President's Report:
Despite the importance of moral development to the individual student
and the society, one cannot say that higher education has demonstrated
a deep concern for the problem .... Especially in large universities, the
subject is not treated as a serious responsibility worthy of sustained dis-
cussion and determined action by the faculty and administration.
DEREK BOK, THE PRESIDENT's REPORT 1986-87 31 (Cambridge: Harvard Univer-
sity Press 1987).
Dallas Willard, Professor of Philosophy at USC, responds:
[T]he failure of will on the part of educators that Bok courageously
points out is inevitable. Had he strolled across Harvard Yard to Emer-
son Hall and consulted with some of the most influential thinkers of our
nation, he would have discovered that there now is no recognized knowl-
edge upon which projects of fostering moral development could be based.
DALLAs WILLARD, THE DIVINE CONSPIRACy 3 (HarperCollins 1997).
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the moral sensibilities of a substantial segment of the population. 2 7 1
Also, Hollywood producer Cecil B. DeMille became involved in the in-
stallation of the monuments to promote his movie The Ten Command-
ments, not to promote a religion. 2 72 In accepting this monument, it is
clear that even if the Eagles' purpose is imputed to Plattsmouth, the
city did not violate the Supreme Court's purpose requirement. There-
fore, the Eighth Circuit would be faced with only three logical choices:
adopt the city administrator's proposed purpose; assign the Eagles'
purpose to the city; or find that the evidence was insufficient to deter-
mine the city's purpose in erecting the monument and move on to the
second prong of the Lemon test.
Second, unlike McCreary County, the physical context in which
Plattsmouth's monument is displayed is sufficiently secular to fulfill
the purpose requirement. Before diving deeper into this reasoning,
one must consider the Supreme Court's warning: "[flocus exclusively
on the religious component of any activity would inevitably lead to its
invalidation under the Establishment Clause."273 Plattsmouth has
several secular items which are part of the park as required by Mc-
Creary County.274 The monument stands near a recreation area con-
taining a barbeque grill, benches, picnic tables, and a permanent
shelter.2 75 Each of these items contains a plaque bearing the name of
its donor and the date on which it was donated. 2 76 While it is true
that no other statues or monuments with historic significance are visi-
ble within the immediate vicinity of the monument, 2 77 the Supreme
Court only requires other contextually related secular items to be part
of the area.2 78 For example, in Lynch v. Donnelly,2 79 the Supreme
Court upheld a creche displayed by the City of Pawtucket, Rhode Is-
land in a private shopping center because the creche was displayed in
the context of the holiday season and amongst other secular items. 28 0
The Lynch decision requires that some secular items which would nor-
mally belong in the particular context be displayed along with the re-
ligious item. Plattsmouth's religious item, a Ten Commandments
monument, is displayed along with other secular items typically found
in a park of Plattsmouth's size. The other items in the park place the
271. See Scott C. Idleman, Religious Premises, Legislative Judgments, and the Estab-
lishment Clause, 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 16 (2002) (citations omitted).
272. Freedom from Religion Found., 898 P.2d at 1017.
273. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680 (1984).
274. McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2731 (2005).
275. ACLU Neb. Found. v. City of Plattsmouth, 358 F.3d 1020 (8th Cir. 2004), rev'd,
419 F.3d 772 (8th Cir. 2005); Winkler Affidavit, supra note 2, 4, 6.
276. ACLU Neb. Found. v. City of Plattsmouth, 186 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1027 (D. Neb.
2002).
277. Id.
278. See Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989); Lynch, 465 U.S. 668.
279. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
280. Id. at 682.
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monument in a physical context focused on the history and traditions
of small town life. Therefore, the physical context of the monument
does not offend the Supreme Court's purpose requirement.
Finally, the city remained neutral when it provided its current pur-
poses for retaining the monument. The city should be allowed to rec-
ognize the Eagles' contributions, the artistic value of the monument,
and the longevity of the monument's position.28 1 Unlike the counties'
purported purpose in McCreary County,282 there is no evidence that
the city offered these purposes in a disingenuous manner. From the
record in Plattsmouth II, the Eighth Circuit en banc clearly could have
found that the city did not offer a "sham" purpose or have a secondary
secular purpose about its Eagles monument.
2. What Affects the Reasonable Observer?
The Supreme Court modified its interpretation of the "effects"
prong of the Lemon test after Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in
Lynch v. Donnelly 28 3 argued that the Court should consider whether
the religious activity or display was an endorsement or disapproval of
religion in the mind of the "reasonable observer."28 4 The endorse-
ment test asks whether the monument "is sufficiently likely to be per-
ceived by adherents of the controlling denominations as an
endorsement, and by nonadherents as disapproval, of their individual
religious choices." 28 5 Likewise, a display must not send a "message to
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political
community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are
insiders, favored members of the political community."28 6 Although
the endorsement test has been criticized, 28 7 most members of the
281. Winkler Affidavit, supra note 2, 4, 6.
282. The counties argued that their purpose was "to demonstrate that the Ten Com-
mandments were part of the foundation of American Law and Government and to
educate the citizens of the county regarding some of the documents that played a
significant role in the foundation of our system of law and government." Mc-
Creary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2731 (2005) (citing ACLU v. McCreary
County, 145 F. Supp. 2d 845, 848 (E.D. Ky. 2001)).
283. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
284. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 595 (1989) (applying the en-
dorsement test to a Christmas display).
285. ACLU Neb. Found. v. City of Plattsmouth, 358 F.3d 1020, 1040 (8th Cir. 2004)
(quoting Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 595), rev'd, 419 F.3d 772 (8th Cir. 2005).
286. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
287. Discerning the qualities of the reasonable observer has been recognized and criti-
cized by Scholars as an "ad-hoc, fact-based analysis of Establishment Clause
problems." Choper, supra note 185, at 510-15; see also Michael W. McConnell,
Religious Participation in Public Programs: Religious Freedom at a Crossroads,
59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 149-51 (1992) (noting the impossibility of defining "en-
dorsement," the tendency of the test to treat religion with suspicion and therefore
collide with the Free Exercise Clause, the test's bias against religion and among
religions, and the test's lack of historical support).
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Court apply it288 using a mythical "reasonable observer."28 9 The "rea-
sonable observer" knows the history of the display as a whole and the
history of any religious objects which make up the display.2 90
Under Lynch and Allegheny, a court may rely on the monument's
context to determine its effect on the reasonable observer. 29 1 In
Lynch, the Supreme Court upheld a creche displayed by the City of
Pawtucket in a private shopping center because the creche was dis-
played in the context of the holiday season and amongst other secular
items.29 2 In Allegheny, the Supreme Court struck down a creche dis-
played inside the county courthouse without any secular items to miti-
gate its religious context, but allowed an eighteen-foot menorah
because it stood next to a forty-foot Christmas tree.2 93 The menorah
was permitted to remain, mostly because it was displayed in the con-
text of a display recognizing "cultural diversity."29 4 Lynch and Alle-
gheny drew boundary lines between the Court's view of impermissible
establishment and permissible recognition of religion. The Platts-
mouth H court would find that the monument's context is similar to
the crbche in Lynch and the menorah in Allegheny. The city pointed
out the other donated items in the park and argued that it merely
recognized the Eagles by keeping the monument. 29 5 Like the consti-
tutional displays in Lynch and Allegheny, the reasonable observer
would find nothing out of the ordinary in Plattsmouth's Memorial
Park; the park merely houses items donated by various individuals
and organizations for the benefit of the community.
The court would also have to avoid several other pitfalls in consid-
ering the reasonable observer's perspective of the monument. First,
the court must avoid the temptation to focus only on the text of the
monument when it determines the monument's effect. 29 6 Rather, the
court should examine whether the religious text used in the display
has been used in other constitutionally permissible settings. In this
case, the Ten Commandments have often been used in permissible re-
ligious settings and have a secular as well as a religious purpose. Sec-
ond, the court must avoid the temptation of reaching a decision which
is openly hostile toward religion. 29 7 Accordingly, the court could ex-
288. See Feldman, supra note 185, at 698.
289. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 620.
290. Capital Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 779-81 (1995)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
291. See, e.g., Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 597 ("[T]he effect of the government's use of relig-
ious symbolism depends upon its context.").
292. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 682 (1984).
293. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 597.
294. Id. at 619.
295. See Defendants' Brief, supra note 169, at 25.
296. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680; Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2869 (2005)
(plurality opinion).
297. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2871 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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amine whether any particular religion received benefits greater than
those already approved by the Supreme Court.298 In Plattsmouth, it
is impossible to say that any religion receives more benefit from the
city keeping a Ten Commandments monument in the corner of its
park, than from any of those actions already approved by the Supreme
Court. 2 99 Finally, the court must remember that Allegheny and Van
Orden teach us that it is not necessary to purge all religious displays
from government property.30 0
As shown above, had the Eighth Circuit evaluated Plattsmouth's
monument under the Lemon test, including the heightened purpose
requirement under McCreary County, it would have found that the
city did not have a religious purpose, nor did the monument have the
effect of endorsing religion.
C. The Supreme Court's Future Eagles Analysis; A
Grandfather Clause to Pass Over Eagles Monuments
The Supreme Court's decision in Van Orden and the Eighth Cir-
cuit's decision in Plattsmouth II allowed both government entities to
retain their monuments, but it is likely there will be future challenges
to other Eagles donations. Therefore, the Supreme Court should cre-
ate a "grandfather clause"3o1 to its typical Establishment Clause anal-
ysis for religious activities, 302 displays, and, particularly, historically
important Eagles Ten Commandments monuments. The Court has
several compelling reasons to ignore a typical Lemon test analysis
when it considers Eagles Ten Commandments monuments. First, all
the Eagles' monuments share the same constitutionally permissible
underlying purpose. Second, the Eagles' monuments were originally
erected in the 1950s and 1960s and most have stood without interrup-
tion for the last forty to fifty years. Finally, a bright line rule for Ea-
gles monuments prevents lower courts from ruling in a manner which
is hostile towards religion.
298. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 681-82.
299. ACLU Neb. Found. v. City of Plattsmouth, 358 F.3d 1020, 1048 (8th Cir. 2004)
(Bowman, J., dissenting), rev'd, 419 F.3d 772 (8th Cir. 2005). See Lynch, 465 U.S.
at 683.
300. See also Lynch, 465 U.S. at 691.
301. See supra note 239.
302. The phrase 'Under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance is an example of an activity
which the Court should grandfather in and exempt from typical Lemon test scru-
tiny. The Court will likely have this opportunity, should the recent holding in
Newdow v. Congress of U.S., 383 F. Supp. 2d 1229 (E.D. Cal. 2005), be affirmed
on appeal. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals will likely find that the Pledge is
unconstitutional, as it found when it decided the merits in Newdow v. U.S. Con-
gress, 328 F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 2003). Like the monument in Van Orden, the phrase
"Under God" is not devoid of religious significance, however, it is rooted in more
than fifty years of tradition and should be exempted from traditional Establish-
ment Clause analysis and found to be constitutional.
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First, the Court should exempt Eagles monuments from its typical
Lemon test analysis because all of the monuments share a permissible
purpose. All were donated by local chapters of the Eagles under a pro-
gram sponsored by the national organization's Youth Guidance Com-
mittee to inform young people about moral standards which could
govern their actions.303 The Eagles specifically wanted a non-secta-
rian version of the Ten Commandments to avoid the appearance that
the monuments favored a particular version of the Ten Command-
ments or particular religious belief.304 Moreover, as was noted above,
Cecil B. DeMille suggested that the Eagles distribute versions of the
Decalogue to coincide with the release of his film The Ten Command-
ments.30 5 All of these factors should lead the Court to permit the Ea-
gles' monuments on public property. Under Van Orden, the Court
allowed a Ten Commandments display even though the Decalogue has
religious meaning because of its significant historical contribution. 30 6
If the Court had not recognized this contribution, government would
be forced to remove all Ten Commandments references from public
display or argue a fiction that the Ten Commandments have no relig-
ious significance. The former would surely "lead the law to exhibit a
hostility toward religion that has no place in our Establishment
Clause traditions."307 The latter would propagate a lie to believers
and unbelievers-that frequency can remove a religious message from
words or symbols. 30 8 A government body that currently has an Eagles
monument should be allowed to keep it because the underlying pur-
pose of the monument does not offend the Establishment Clause.
Rather, these monuments pay tribute to an organization which
wanted to display a moral lesson for youth, the creativity of the pro-
ducer of a classic movie, and the non-sectarian recognition of the
moral fabric on which our country, the Constitution, and the premises
on which the Establishment Clause were based.
Second, the Court should create an exception for Eagles monu-
ments because all of the monuments were installed in the 1950s and
1960s, and most have stood without challenge since that time. This is
the core reason for the grandfather clause. As Justice Breyer wrote:
[Forty] years suggest more strongly than can any set of formulaic tests that
few individuals, whatever their system of beliefs, are likely to have under-
stood the monument as amounting, in any significantly detrimental way, to a
303. State v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 898 P.2d 1013, 1017 (Colo. 1995),
cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1111 (1996). See Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2870
(2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).
304. Freedom From Religion Found., 898 P.2d at 1017.
305. Id.
306. See Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2864 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 2870 (Breyer,
J., concurring).
307. Id. at 2871 (Breyer, J., concurring).
308. Id. at 2866-67 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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government effort to favor a particular religious sect, primarily to promote
religion over nonreligion, to engage in any religious practice, to compel any
religious practice, or to work deterrence of any religious belief.3 0 9
The Court has granted similar exceptions for longstanding religious
traditions in the United States, such as legislative prayer in Marsh v.
Chambers.3 10 In Marsh, the Court permitted the State of Nebraska to
continue its practice of opening its legislative session with prayer by a
paid chaplain because "the men who wrote the First Amendment Re-
ligion Clauses did not view paid legislative chaplains and opening
prayers as a violation of that Amendment... ."311 An Eagles grandfa-
ther clause would be similar to Marsh, where the Congressional prac-
tice of prayer served as a constitutionally permissible example for
states to follow 3 12 and the State of Nebraska itself enjoyed a long-
standing tradition of opening prayer. 3 13 Ten Commandments dis-
plays, such as Eagles monuments, should enjoy a similar exception.
An Eagles grandfather clause is based partly on the tradition of dis-
playing the Ten Commandments on important government buildings,
and partly on the duration which each monument has stood without
question. The grandfather clause would allow the Court to pass
over 3 14 Eagles monuments without stopping to evaluate whether the
reasonable observer would find that the monument as an endorse-
ment of religion.
Finally, the Court should create an exception for all Eagles monu-
ments because it prevents hostility towards religion in violation of the
"Religion Clauses." This exception would also remove the temptation
for lower courts to remove monuments based on the history surround-
ing their installation or the context of the monument. In Books v. City
of Elkhart,315 the Seventh Circuit removed Elkhart's monument after
it examined the ceremony by which it was installed. However in Van
Orden and Plattsmouth II, the Supreme Court and Eighth Circuit al-
lowed Plattsmouth and Texas, respectively, to keep their monuments
because no record of the installations have survived. A grandfather
clause would correctly preclude lower courts from making this exami-
nation because it leads only to hostility against those government
body's who had record of clergy present at a ceremony. It is illogical to
conclude that a citizen of Elkhart would think that her city estab-
lished a religious form of government after reading of the ceremony in
309. Id. at 2870 (Breyer, J., concurring).
310. 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983).
311. Id. at 788.
312. Id. at 792.
313. Id. at 789-90 (citing Neb. Jour. of Council, General Assembly, 1st Sess., 16 (Jan.
22, 1855)).
314. See Exodus 12:12-13.
315. 235 F.3d 292 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1058 (2001). See supra section
II.B.
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an old paper; whereas, a citizen of Plattsmouth would conclude the
opposite because he found nothing in a similar investigation. A grand-
father clause would stop courts short of this investigation and allow
government bodies to keep their Eagles monuments.
In a similar situation in Adland v. Russ,316 the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals prevented Kentucky from re-installing an Eagles monu-
ment partly because the monument "physically dwarfs [the seven
other historical monuments and massive floral clock and] implies that
they are secondary in importance"3 17 However, the Supreme Court
approved the Eagles' monument in Van Orden after considering the
seventeen monuments and twenty-one historical markers on the
Texas state capitol grounds. 3 18 The Court should not allow the lower
courts to involve themselves in a counting game or stature comparison
which would require a government body to place a number of taller
objects near the Eagles' monument for it be constitutional. The
Eighth Circuit correctly avoided this pitfall, but Adland's decision
does not suggest that all courts will be immune. The Court should
remove this temptation for hostility and grandfather Eagles
monuments.
V. CONCLUSION
The mountain of Establishment Clause jurisprudence has only be-
come foggier since the Supreme Court's decisions in Van Orden v.
Perry and McCreary County v. ACLU. The government must strike a
delicate balance between the two requirements of the Constitution:
that it "neither abdicate [its] responsibility to maintain a division be-
tween church and state nor evince a hostility to religion by disabling
the government from in some ways recognizing our religious heritage
. "...,319 The Eighth Circuit en banc's decision in Plattsmouth II cor-
rectly struck that balance and allowed Plattsmouth, Nebraska to
maintain the Eagles' monument in Memorial Park.
The Plattsmouth II court correctly applied the new elements of the
Van Orden test and reversed the panel's decision. First, the Platts-
mouth II court correctly determined that the monument was a passive
display of a religious text. Second, the Plattsmouth II court correctly
determined that the monument's text was recognized in the United
States' historical traditions. Third, the Plattsmouth II court correctly
recognized that Plattsmouth's monument had its own historical tradi-
tion. Finally, the Plattsmouth II court correctly found that the monu-
ment did not have a religious purpose. The monument did not stand
316. 307 F.3d 471 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 999 (2003).
317. Id. at 477, 482.
318. Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2858 (2005) (plurality opinion).
319. Id. at 2859.
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to acknowledge the city's establishment of a monotheistic religion but
rather to recognize a civic organization for its role in the community
and to recognize the Ten Commandments role in the foundations of
American government. Therefore, the Plattsmouth II court properly
found that the monument was constitutionally permissible.
Even if the Plattsmouth II court had not chosen to apply the Van
Orden test, it would have found that the monument was constitutional
under a traditional Lemon test analysis. Under the heightened "pur-
pose" requirements in McCreary County, the scant history of the mon-
ument's installation would have required the court to embrace the
city's purported purpose, impute the Eagles' purpose to the city, or
find that the purpose could not be determined on the record. The
Plattsmouth II court would also have found that the monument did
not have the effect of advancing or inhibiting religion. The Constitu-
tion only requires other displays which would typically belong in the
setting in order to balance the religious message of the monument. In
Plattsmouth II, these items were the picnic benches, shelters, play
ground items, and other park memorabilia. Under Van Orden and
Lynch, the Constitution does not require a park full of other historical
displays, but only other items which fit the setting in which the relig-
ious monument is displayed.
Finally, the Supreme Court should grandfather Eagles monuments
into the Establishment Clause and ignore its typical Lemon test anal-
ysis. Eagles monuments share the same constitutionally permissible
underlying purposes; were originally erected in the 1950s and 1960s;
most have stood without interruption for the last forty to fifty years;
and this bright line rule prevents lower courts from hostility towards
religion.
Religion continues to be an important part of the lives of most
Americans. The interaction between religion and government will
continue to be an issue of debate in the parks, on the courthouse
lawns, and in courtrooms across our country. The place and historical
importance of the Ten Commandments will continue to be a divisive
issue because of the Court's conflicting decisions in Van Orden v. Perry
and McCreary County v. ACLU. As the Court continues to define the
boundaries of the Establishment Clause, the mountain of jurispru-
dence will only grow. Fortunately for Plattsmouth and many other
communities in the Eighth Circuit, the boundaries clearly allow Ea-
gles monuments to be displayed on public property.
Keith T. Peters
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